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This paper examines renewable energy (RE) investment and the role of a country’s le-
gal system in shaping investment decisions. Analysing data from 236 renewable energy
companies between 2000 and 2017 across the world, our study establishes that those in a
common law system are more responsive to growth opportunities in RE investment, while
facing greater ﬁnancial constraints than their counterparts in civil law systems. Our study
demonstrates that the global imbalance in RE development is caused by the inﬂuence of a
country’s legal system, which determines the regulatory and business ethos that impacts
on the trajectory of investment, and by the varying degrees of accountability implicit in a
country’s governance environment. Our research raises the implication that the opportu-
nity costs of forgone economic gains are in direct conﬂict with long-term environmental
goals, retarding the transition from carbon-based to sustainable sources of energy, and
provides insights into how development can be stimulated by ﬁscal incentives, favourable
regulations, societal engagement, improved access to ﬁnance and the alignment of na-
tional strategies. Our ﬁndings contribute to the economic literature of legal origin theory
and establish fundamental principles for reﬁning global RE development strategy and
confronting the challenge of climate change.
Introduction
The dire threat to the world presented by cli-
mate change has inspired a preponderance of aca-
demic literature. Studies have explored the issue
from a range of perspectives, including the neces-
sity of government subsidization in the form of
Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs), tax incentives and trade-
able green certiﬁcates (Abolhosseini and Hesh-
mati, 2014); the loss of public support as the social
burden increases (Tanaka et al., 2017); the need
for substantial private investment (Wu¨stenhagen
and Menichetti, 2012); and the requirement for
the development of global energy governance and
collective international action (Florini and Sova-
cool, 2009). These studies, among many others,
have illuminated this branch of research, raising
questions concerning social factors, commercial
engagement and public policy in relation to this
twenty-ﬁrst century crisis.
From the outset, returns to investors have been
made more attractive by government subsidies,
which are essential because of the uncertain and
protracted nature of RE deployment, with 20 to
25 years passing before projects begin to show
positive returns (Justice, 2009). However, ﬁnan-
cial support increases power bills, entailing an in-
evitable political cost (Tanaka et al., 2017), and
governments subject to periodic re-election imple-
ment cut-backs in response to public resistance
(Bloomberg, 2018; Pearson and Watson, 2012).
Such adverse political reactions exert a negative
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inﬂuence on RE investment, resulting in a boom-
and-bust pattern of development (Barradale, 2010;
Victor and Yanosek, 2011), making it abundantly
clear that continued support from the public is crit-
ically important to RE development (Abdmouleh,
Alammari and Gastli, 2015).
As a consequence of such countervailing inﬂu-
ences, development across the world has been un-
balanced, with some nations achieving far more
than others. Countries such as theUSA (Wei, Pata-
dia and Kannen, 2010), the UK (Foxon et al.,
2015), Germany (Wu¨stenhagen and Bilharz, 2006)
and Japan (Ku¨ramochi, 2015), among many oth-
ers, have achieved varying degrees of success in the
last decade, but RE investment has fallen signiﬁ-
cantly in all of them in recent years. There are com-
plex causes of this phenomenon, some of which
can be traced to the resistance of consumers to
the ﬁnancial burden that subsidizing RE imposes
(Tanaka et al., 2017) and some to the need of gov-
ernments to develop a uniﬁed approach (Florini
and Sovacool, 2009). This makes it clear that the
dynamics of advancement depend, to a signiﬁcant
extent, on how governments develop a support sys-
tem for RE development while retaining public
backing. Many studies focus on social inﬂuences,
which have an undoubted relevance to this inquiry
(Tanaka et al., 2017), while others identify prag-
matic and ﬁnancial issues as fundamental causes.
However, as yet no studies have explored in what
ways a country’s legal system may have inﬂuenced
RE investment in its course of development, which
is the approach that our investigation adopts.
The legal origin theory argues that differences
between legal systems give rise to differences in
the ways business systems function (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). The theory
maintains that a common law system supports
shareholder protection and a laissez-faire, market-
driven approach; whereas a civil law system takes
a stakeholder view, prompting government and
regulatory intervention in public policy. Empiri-
cal studies offer support for the thesis that the
regulatory frameworks of common law countries
tend to encourage market value-driven investment
in renewable energy sources (Boersma and John-
son, 2012; Brown and Hess 2016; Chasek, 2007;
Jacoby, O’Sullivan and Paltsev, 2011); while poli-
cies in civil law countries, and especially those in
Scandinavia with the highest corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) ratings (Liang and Renneboog,
2017), tend to encourage investment in RE sources
(Chasek, 2007; Reiner et al., 2006; Renn and Mar-
shall, 2016; Szulecki et al., 2016).
Our study pursues a similar line of inquiry in
an area that has not yet been explored, examin-
ing howdifferent nations invest inREdevelopment
and how its growth may be constrained by ﬁnan-
cial resources, systems of national governance and,
above all, the nature of their legal systems. As we
shall argue, a country’s legal system may signiﬁ-
cantly shape how RE developments progress.
Such a line of inquiry is both opportune and
crucial to inform global policy-making and com-
mercial development, at a time when many coun-
tries have started to formulate national strategies
for RE development.1 As calls to combat climate
change grow ever more strident, an investigation
into the impediments that may constrain RE de-
velopment is essential to help deliver solutions to
what may well become an existential threat. Re-
search in this area is therefore timely and criti-
cal from commercial, social and humanitarian per-
spectives.
The primary objective of our study is, therefore,
to analyse how cross-country differences in legal
systems and national governance inﬂuence RE in-
vestment in an international context. We focus on
the application of fundamental principles under-
pinning the investment decisions of renewable en-
ergy companies, exploring how RE development
varies across countries under different legal sys-
tems and how this process is inﬂuenced by sys-
tems of national governance. We therefore inves-
tigate ﬁrm-level investment of 236 RE companies
between 2000 and 2017 across the world, seeking
to address four research questions: (1) Which legal
system most effectively encourages investment in
RE sources? (2) Do companies specializing in cre-
ating RE sources face greater ﬁnancial constraints
under a common law system than companies op-
erating under a civil law system? (3) Do growth
prospects in RE have a greater impact on the in-
vestment decision in a common law system than in
a civil law system? (4) Does national governance
1Investment in renewable energy on a global scale has
grown rapidly in recent years, achieving a record level of
US$312.2 billion in 2015, with acquisition activities in
clean energy continuing to rise to over US$100 billion
during 2016 (Bloomberg, 2018). In 2015, investment in re-
newable energy sources in developing economies overtook
investment in developed countries, with strong commit-
ments from China, India and Brazil likely to make them
signiﬁcant players in the coming decade.
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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ultimately inﬂuenceRE investment decisions at the
ﬁrm level?
Our study derives several signiﬁcant ﬁndings.
First, we provide evidence of the global imbalance
in RE investment and an empirically based ac-
count of this phenomenon. Second, companies in
civil law systems face lower ﬁnancial constraints in
RE development than companies in common law
systems, supporting the contention that such dis-
parities occur, in part, because governments in civil
law countries tend to be more interventionist, ad-
hering to CSR principles, and are therefore more
likely to adopt policies for the subsidization of RE.
In common law countries, however, where laissez-
faire systems render markets pre-eminent and cen-
tralized support is controversial and intermittent,
ﬁscal pragmatism makes it difficult for govern-
ments to extend subsidies or ﬁnancial providers to
offer ﬁnance for RE projects, which are essentially
CSR-driven and carry a perceived high risk. Third,
companies in common law countries are more re-
sponsive to growth prospects of RE investments
than companies in civil law countries, because their
decisions are constrained by a market-based sys-
tem that is strongly protective of investors’ rights,
compelling them to pursue value-enhancing devel-
opments; whereas companies in civil law countries
are inspired primarily by a desire to increase social
wealth and satisfy CSR ideals through their REde-
velopments. Fourth, country-level systems of gov-
ernance facilitate the ﬁnancing of RE investment
in civil law jurisdictions because their ethos favours
environmental, social and governance (ESG) prin-
ciples, which are implicit in actors’ behaviours at
both national and corporate levels. Conversely, in
a common law system, in the face of powerful
market forces, a system of country-level gover-
nance does not modify the decisions of ﬁnancial
providers to eschew RE projects that do not of-
fer returns in a timescale commensurate with in-
vestors’ requirements.
The major contribution of our research is to
extend this strand of literature into an investiga-
tion of how cross-country differences in legal sys-
tems inﬂuence RE investment in an international
context. Our study offers a new insight into how
the contention between economic gains and long-
term environmental goals has retarded the transi-
tion from fossil fuels to non-polluting sources of
energy, suggesting how this can be ameliorated by
favourable government policies, benign regulation
and ﬁnancial support from government, creditors
and investors to stimulate private-sector invest-
ment. Our investigation establishes that the tran-
sition towards RE would be more likely to succeed
if nations collaborated to align national strate-
gies, with individual governments making measur-
able commitments to sustain such initiatives. This
requires policy-makers to undertake stable pro-
grammes for change (Justice, 2009) that involve
not only the regulatory and corporate sectors, but
also national and international communities, with-
out whose backing development will suffer peri-
odic interruptions (Shrimali, Lynes and Indvik,
2015). We are conﬁdent that our research informs
the long-term strategies that governments and the
energy sector should adopt in the transition from
carbon-based to sustainable sources of power, of-
fering policy-makers and regulators guidance on
how to facilitate RE development at national, con-
tinental and global levels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
second section reviews theories and literature and
proposes our hypotheses. The third section dis-
cusses methodological issues. The fourth section
presents and discusses the empirical results. The
ﬁfth section concludes with recommendations for
future research and a policy agenda.
Literature review and hypothesis
development
The broad economic and social signiﬁcance of
the legal framework governs corporate conduct.
The legal origin hypothesis explicitly acknowl-
edges that a legal system determines in whose in-
terests a company should be run. The fundamen-
tals of the legal system establish the legal rights
of investors and creditors (Djankov, McLiesh and
Shleifer, 2007) and govern the efficiency of con-
tract enforcement and accountability. Different le-
gal systems impose on corporate organizations
varying degrees of accountability to stakeholders,
incorporating distinctively different legal protec-
tions and levels of enforcement. Disparities be-
tween legal traditions have a powerful impact on
real activity, leading to cross-country differences
in long-run rates of economic development. This
socio-political mechanism gives rise to divergent
ﬁnancial systems, which shape the regulation and
working of ﬁnancial markets, capital accumulation
and allocation, and the growth of corporate value
(La Porta et al., 1997, 1998).
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008)
assert that a common law system, based on the En-
glish legal tradition, offers the greatest protection
to investors, with legal safeguards incorporated to
prevent expropriation by corporate insiders and
to promote wealth creation through encouraging
value-enhancing investment by outsiders (Shleifer
and Vishney, 1997). In common law systems, well-
developed and strongly regulated stock markets
dominate, protecting shareholders by enforcing
corporate transparency and accountability, under-
pinned by company law and mandatory account-
ing standards (Wurgler, 2000). Thesemarket-based
systems adopt the precepts of laissez-faire, which
deprecate government intervention in economies
and emphasize the supremacy of market mecha-
nisms, granting primacy to shareholders’ interests.
Such a focus constrains managers to investing in
wealth-creating projects that offer the prospect of
growth commensurate with their investors’ needs.
In civil law systems, in contrast, multi-
stakeholder forms of governance are reinforced
by differing principles and practices, empha-
sizing a perspective that privileges the complex
requirements of a much wider range of corporate
stakeholders (Adams, 1998). Such systems incor-
porate centralized government control and are
more interventionist than their counterparts in
common law countries (Mahoney, 2001; Pistor,
2013), while encouraging a universal banking
system within a regulatory environment favouring
a stakeholder perspective (Allen, Carletti and
Marquez, 2015; Magill, Quinzii and Rochet,
2015). In such a legal system, universal banking
takes a more active role, mobilizing capital,
overseeing investment decisions of corporate
managers, providing risk management vehicles,
exerting central control and imposing regulation
(Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Purda, 2008).
The preponderance of research conﬁrms that an
organic relationship exists between a legal system
and the businesses and transactions that it regu-
lates, and that this strongly inﬂuences the manner
in which investments are determined and ﬁnanced.
These propositions provide the basis for the devel-
opment of our hypotheses.
Legal origins and renewable energy investment
The information asymmetric hypothesis argues
that imperfections in the capital market increase
the cost of external ﬁnance and create binding ﬁ-
nancing constraints on a ﬁrm’s ﬁxed investments.
The cost wedge between internal and external
funds leads the ﬁrm to rely more on internal
cash ﬂow to ﬁnance investment projects, making
it extremely sensitive to internal funds. As small,
young, high-risk companies are less able to gener-
ate sufficient internal capital to ﬁnance projects, es-
pecially at the inception and developmental stages,
they have to invest less than the ﬁrst-best optimum
or bypass value-enhancing investment projects al-
together, constraining further growth and hence
economic development (Liu, 2013; Thakor and
Wilson, 1995).
Relative to other industrial sectors, the RE sec-
tor has some distinctive features. First, being in
an emerging industry, it has a shorter history,
with no legacy of stability or success to encour-
age external investment ﬁnancing (Zhang, Cao and
Zou, 2016). Second, investments in RE are risky,
with returns to equity made over periods of 20 to
25 years (Justice, 2009). Such lengthy payback pe-
riods are caused, in part, by the need to create
infrastructure, whereas infrastructure already ex-
ists in the traditional energy (TE) sector, along
with a developed technology to support conven-
tional development. Third, successful implemen-
tation relies heavily on policy support (Tanaka
et al., 2017) because renewable energy production
is only marginally competitive, if at all, in com-
parison to conventional technologies (Bloomberg,
2018). Without active government support, com-
panies in general, and those in common law coun-
tries in particular, will be wary of investment in this
sector (Abdmouleh, Alammari and Gastli, 2015;
Shrimali, Lynes and Indvik, 2015). Fourth, in spite
of being beset by many uncertainties, the develop-
ment of the RE sector is of considerable strategic
importance for all nations, given the dire threats
of global warming, and since all countries must
pledge to commit assets to these vital develop-
ments, their long-term future is assured.
Since the RE industry is new and evolving, ﬁrms
undertaking such developments tend to be much
smaller than their competitors in the traditional
energy sector and lack an established legacy of suc-
cess (see Table 4 later), hence carrying high levels
of risk. As a consequence, they typically experi-
ence the greatest informational opacity problems
(Myers andMajluf, 1984) andmust surmount high
hurdles to secure external funds (Justice, 2009).
In the face of severely adverse selection prob-
lems, they will be excluded from debt and capital
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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markets altogether. Dynamic RE ﬁrms, therefore,
face liquidity problems and are less able to take on
investment opportunities and achieve economies
of scale rendering them competitive in the market
(Chittenden, Hall and Hutchinson, 1996; Liu and
Pang, 2009).
Such ﬁnancial constraints may, however, be al-
leviated in civil law systems, which have an inter-
ventionist ethos (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer, 2008; Mahoney, 2001) that enables politi-
cians to pursue policies that act in the interests
of social well-being. Their corporate environments
favour capital allocation through powerful bank-
ing institutions while placing emphasis on a stake-
holder perspective and social values (Allen, Car-
letti and Marquez, 2015).
Countries in the Nordic bloc, which exemplify
these social characteristics, sustain a universalist
welfare state, with the objectives of enhancing
individual autonomy and increasing social wealth
(Hicks, 2000; McWhinny, 2013). Although there
are differences between countries in the grouping,
the Scandinavian model of social democracy
incorporates common policies for promoting
economic security and opportunity within a cap-
italist framework (Kenworthy, 2014). Similarly,
countries such as Germany engage in what Dore
(2000) refers to as ‘welfare capitalism’, where
executives are mainly inﬂuenced by diverse stake-
holders such as banks, employees and ﬁrms with
interlocking shareholdings (Adams, 1998). Such
systems engender a social environment within
which governments care for all stakeholders rather
than the few, and are more inclined to promote
the deployment of RE by offering subsidies to
developers.2 Additionally, investment ﬁnance in
civil law systems is primarily sourced by banks,
whose superior insider knowledge and monitoring
powers mitigate the credit risk that they will face
(Purda, 2008), and whose approval of CSR prin-
ciples makes them more likely to offer RE ﬁrms
favourable access to ﬁnance (Cheng, Ioannou and
Serafeim, 2014). For example, driven by CSR ide-
als, the Nordic Investment Bank grants loans for
2The Swedish and Norwegian governments have recently
extended their Green Certiﬁcate scheme, subsidizing RE
deployment, that they have been operating since 2012
(Climate Action, 2017); while in Germany, electricity
from renewable sources is mainly supported through a
market premium scheme, FiTs and low-interest loans
(RES Legal, 2017).
sustainable business projects of between 5 and 25
years, which appears to be a rather liberal lending
regime (Nordic Investment Bank, 2019). In this
benign social milieu, it follows that RE ﬁrms will
have lower ﬁnancing constraints, with investment
cash ﬂow sensitivity reduced by the favourable
support of government and ﬁnancial institutions.
In comparison, RE ﬁrms in common law coun-
tries may encounter more severe ﬁnancial lim-
itations, since funding managers are committed
to minimizing credit risk and ﬁnancing invest-
ments in what are primarily CSR projects ex-
poses them to unacceptable investment outcomes.
In these laissez-faire systems, where markets are
pre-eminent and subsidies politically controversial
and intermittently offered, commercial pragma-
tism makes it more difficult for ﬁrms to raise ﬁ-
nance for RE development. Political expediency
gives rise to the relative instability of subsidization,
which often results in retrenchment (Barradale,
2010; Pearson and Watson, 2012; Shrimali, Lynes
and Indvik, 2015; Victor and Yanosek, 2011), and
prevailing market-based philosophies will also de-
ter banks and investors from funding projects with
uncertain returns. Renewable energy ﬁrms in com-
mon law countries will, as a consequence, experi-
ence greater constraints in securing ﬁnance than
those in civil law countries.
Based on the foregoing discussions, we derive
our ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1: Renewable energy ﬁrms in a common law sys-
tem have higher ﬁnancing constraints in invest-
ment (i.e. are more sensitive to internal cash ﬂow)
than their counterparts in a civil law system.
The legal origin hypothesis maintains that
disparities in the nature of legal systems determine
the strength of investors’ protections (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008; La Porta
et al., 1996). A common law system promotes
strong legal protection for shareholders and fos-
ters value-maximizing investment (La Porta et al.,
1998), enforcing informational transparency,
which enables the market to make informed judge-
ments about the projects that managers select
(Wurgler, 2000). The high degree of accountability
that such an environment ensures, underpinned by
effective contractual arrangements for sharehold-
ers, strongly impels managers to invest in projects
that minimize risk and promise income and cap-
ital growth within a time-frame consonant with
their investors’ requirements. Since RE projects
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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are fundamentally CSR developments with no
immediately foreseeable prospects of success
(Justice, 2009), managers will exercise excessive
caution when investing in such technologies, in
the interests of their shareholders, leading to
their sensitivity to growth opportunities in RE
development.
Conversely, as we have argued, the regulatory
and cultural environment in civil law regimes priv-
ileges a stakeholder perspective rather than the
primacy of shareholders, with the social welfare
systems prevailing explicitly favouring the CSR
principles that buttress a universalist social philos-
ophy. Firms in Nordic countries have the highest
ratings of CSR (Liang and Renneboog, 2017),
sharing ideals supportive of social well-being,
which is suggestive of an ethos that permeates
both the regulatory and corporate sectors. Further,
civil law countries have governments that are pre-
disposed towards active, centralized control (La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008; Ma-
honey, 2001). This facilitates economic interven-
tion by the state, which produces a regulatory en-
vironment strongly supportive of the stakeholder
perspective (Magill, Quinzii andRochet, 2015) and
engenders a commitment to fostering social wealth
(Liang and Renneboog, 2017). Muira (2012) re-
ports that the UK allocates 19.8% of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) to social spending; Germany
26.6%; France 28.3%; and Sweden 32.5%, provid-
ing evidence to support the assertion that govern-
ments’ commitment to public well-being prevails
more strongly in civil than in common law coun-
tries. This tendency to favour social wealth cre-
ation, reinforced by stronger government control,
interventionism and support, is likely to render
managers’ investment decisions on RE less sensi-
tive to the prospects of growth potential than those
of their counterparts in common law countries.
Based on the foregoing discussions, we derive
our second hypothesis:
H2: Renewable energy ﬁrms in a common law sys-
tem are more sensitive to prospects of growth op-
portunities, viz Tobin’s Q, than their counterparts
in a civil law system.
National governance and renewable energy
investment
Cross-country research into the nexus of legal sys-
tems and corporate ﬁnance argues that a legal sys-
tem creates a nurturing environment supported by
a governance mechanism that enhances account-
ability, transparent disclosure, legal oversight for
capital investment and the creation of corporate
value (Hillier et al., 2011). The nature of a gover-
nance system determines how and to what degree
accountability is enforced to protect stakehold-
ers’ interests by means of regulation, rule of law,
and voice and accountability. Regulatory qual-
ity reﬂects the ability of government to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private-sector development,
requiring nations to maintain robust systems of
governance for enforcing legal requirements and
accountability, as well as accommodating stake-
holder expectations. The power of these systems di-
minishes the informational advantage of corporate
insiders and, consequently, reduces the cost of ex-
ternal ﬁnance (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic,
1999). In addition, the functioning of ﬁnancial sys-
tems, underpinned by the rule of law, is subject to
regulations governing conduct to ensure that stan-
dards of ﬁnancial probity are maintained and in-
vestors and customers protected. In the event of
breach, the rule of law will be invoked and those
found guilty of transgression held accountable.
This necessitates an ethos of strong legal enforce-
ment, which effectively imposes extensive investor
protection laws to improve corporate governance
(Defond and Hung, 2004). Where effective, this
regulatory environment alleviates agency problems
through enforcing informational transparency and
accountability, thereby encouraging more efficient
capital formation and allocation, and promoting
corporate value (Walker, Zhang and Ni, 2019).
Further, a well-developed system of national gov-
ernance promotes the principles of voice and ac-
countability, which give stakeholders the right to
express criticisms of corporate insiders and hold
them accountable by using their powers of free-
dom of speech, free association and access to free
media. These rights also ensure that management
decisions are held up to public scrutiny, empower-
ing investors, market-makers and other stakehold-
ers to reach judgements on company prospects.
The foregoing discussions support the argument
that a system of national governance inﬂuences the
prevailing business ethos, which may, in turn, im-
pact on managerial decisions at the corporate level
(Kwok and Tadesse, 2006).
Common law countries, as we have contended,
embrace laissez-faire market principles that deter
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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centralized intervention in economies, having a ju-
diciary largely independent of government control
and governance systems that encouragewealth cre-
ation and informational transparency. Albeit gov-
ernments offer support to RE development in the
form of subsidies or tax incentives, these may be
summarily curtailed or withdrawn in response to
political expediency. Investment banks and cor-
porate funds, responsible for returning proﬁts to
their investors, will be loath to advance capital
to unsubsidized, high-risk RE companies, pre-
ferring to fund value-creating projects elsewhere.
Such market-based judgements are well founded
on pragmatic commercial reasoning and so an
overarching system of country-level governance
is unlikely to exert a supplementary inﬂuence on
fund providers’ decisions.
Within this system, the self-same market pre-
cepts are embedded in corporate culture, con-
straining managers to invest in wealth-creating
projects and rendering them averse to RE invest-
ments that do not offer returns in a time-frame
that matches the demands of their investors. Their
antipathy towards projects of uncertain worth is
reinforced by an overarching system of country-
level governance, which embodies the fundamen-
tal business precepts that they instinctively apply.
It is the macro-level strictures imposed by country-
level governance that create and regulate the ﬁ-
nancial environment in which managers work, and
which will limit a propensity to make subopti-
mal investment decisions. Should they do so, infor-
mational transparency facilitated by country-level
governance will expose them to public account-
ability, while the laws and regulation that such sys-
tems embody will impose sanctions that act as de-
terrents to transgressors. It is therefore logical to
conjecture that this overarching inﬂuence is likely
to augment ﬁrms’ investment Q sensitivity.
Civil law countries, in contrast, exert a stronger
degree of centralized control and privilege a stake-
holder perspective, encouraging the adoption of
CSRprinciples and social wealth creation, with the
enforcement of laws and accountability favouring
the development of sustainable sources of energy.3
3In Scandinavian countries, the laws against environmen-
tal pollution are strong. The Environmental Code, pro-
mulgated in Sweden in 1999, has the objective of pro-
moting ‘ . . . sustainable development which will ensure a
healthy and sound environment for present and future
generations’ (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency,
The ideals of social welfare appear to pervade soci-
ety at every level, encouraging governments to sub-
sidize RE investment (Sovacool, 2017), banks to
provide investment ﬁnance (Cheng, Ioannou and
Serafeim, 2013), ﬁrms to engage in RE projects
and society in general to look benignly on these
societal aspirations. Therefore, it is logical to pro-
pose that a system of country-level governance in
a civil law jurisdiction will encourage the ﬁnanc-
ing of companies investing in RE developments,
arguably reducing their ﬁnancial constraints.
Within this ethos, the primacy of the stake-
holder perspective, underpinned by cooperative
business and institutional attitudes (Strand, Free-
man and Hockerts, 2015), promotes sustainabil-
ity and ESG principles. This suggests that values
supportive of RE development in civil law coun-
tries are internalized by governments, institutions,
commerce and citizens alike. In this universal cul-
ture, such precepts are as deeply rooted in busi-
ness consciousness as they are in the regulatory
environment, so thatmacro-level stricturesmay ex-
ert only a marginal inﬂuence on micro-level be-
haviour. It therefore follows that country-level gov-
ernance is likely to have aminimal impact on ﬁrms’
investment Q sensitivity.
To assess the validity of these arguments,
we adopt as independent variables the World
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators: regula-
tory quality; rule of law; voice and accountability,
and evaluate their impacts by means of their inter-
action with cash ﬂow and Tobin’s Q. Based on the
foregoing discussions, we derive our third set of hy-
potheses:
H3a: The joint effect of national governance and
cash ﬂow in reducing ﬁnancing constraints in in-
vestment is more pronounced for renewable en-
ergy ﬁrms in a civil law system than for their
counterparts in a common law system.
H3b: The joint effect of national governance and
growth opportunities, viz Tobin’s Q, in increas-
ing investment sensitivity to prospects of growth
opportunities is more pronounced for renewable
1999). InNorway, the government controls industrial pol-
luters by granting emission allowances imposing limits on
volumes of discharge (Green House Gas Emission Trad-
ing Act, 2004). Contrast this with the situation in the UK,
where the government has been taken to court repeatedly
for ‘ . . . failing to produce an adequate National Plan to
reduce NO2 pollution’ (Environmental Protection UK,
2019).
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energy ﬁrms in a civil law system than for their
counterparts in a common law system.
Methodological issues
Data and sample
We obtain ﬁnancial data of companies listed on
stock markets globally from Datastream and
country-level governance data from the World-
wide Governance Indicator (WGI) of the World
Bank. The World Bank provides annual GDP
and gross national income (GNI) data series. Our
sample ranges from 2000 to 2017, commencing at
2000 because renewable energy development was
in its early stages before then, and the number
of renewable energy ﬁrms trading was too low
to enable meaningful comparison. Datastream
classiﬁes the energy sector into ‘alternative energy
sources’, covering solar, wind and biomass, and
‘traditional energy sources’, covering electricity,
oil and gas, and multi-utilities producers. We use
the terms ‘alternative energy sources’, as deﬁned
by Datastream, to delineate renewable energy
ﬁrms whose primary operation is the generation
of renewable energy from solar, wind or biomass
sources. For conventional energy ﬁrms, we in-
clude those that generate electricity. As is well
known, other energy sectors, such as oil, gas and
multi-utilities producers, operate primarily in the
USA and UK, while ﬁrms that produce coal are
predominantly in China and India. For represen-
tativeness of our sample, we include ﬁrms that
generate electricity in the traditional energy group.
Our initial sample comprises 405 RE ﬁrms from
20 countries, and 687 TE ﬁrms from 42 countries
worldwide. We restrict each ﬁrm to the country
of its registration to eliminate the noise of hetero-
geneity caused by the legal system and country-
level governance prevailing in different markets,
and therefore remove the ﬁrms with a cross-listing
status. Further, ﬁnancial information of all the
ﬁrms is winsorized at the 1% level to eliminate sig-
niﬁcant outliers. After controlling for missing val-
ues, the effective sample size for the analyses con-
sists of 236 TE ﬁrms from 20 countries, with 1,665
ﬁrm-year observations. The sample, from the elec-
tricity sector, consists of 429 ﬁrms across 42 coun-
tries, with 4,854 observations. The distribution of
the ﬁrms across countries is presented in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that the USA has the greatest
number of RE ﬁrms, hosting 87 and accounting
Table 1. Sample distribution across countries
Panel A: Renewable energy ﬁrms
Firms Observations
Country N % N %
Australia 17 7.20 154 9.25
Canada 11 4.66 100 6.01
China 22 9.32 176 10.57
Denmark 1 0.42 17 1.02
France 6 2.54 27 1.62
Germany 22 9.32 207 12.43
Hong Kong 14 5.93 131 7.87
India 9 3.81 39 2.34
Israel 2 0.85 15 0.90
Italy 2 0.85 6 0.36
Japan 2 0.85 21 1.26
New Zealand 1 0.42 10 0.60
Norway 3 1.27 18 1.08
Singapore 1 0.42 6 0.36
South Korea 7 2.97 63 3.78
Spain 5 2.12 45 2.70
Sweden 8 3.39 35 2.10
Thailand 4 1.69 23 1.38
UK 12 5.08 103 6.19
USA 87 36.86 469 28.17
Total 236 100 1,665 100
Panel B: Traditional energy (electricity) ﬁrms
Firms Observations
Country N % N %
Argentina 8 1.86 92 1.90
Australia 19 4.43 199 4.10
Austria 2 0.47 26 0.54
Bangladesh 8 1.86 44 0.91
Belgium 3 0.70 29 0.60
Brazil 31 7.23 333 6.86
Canada 20 4.66 222 4.57
Chile 13 3.03 183 3.77
China 69 16.08 946 19.49
Colombia 5 1.17 40 0.82
Denmark 1 0.23 15 0.31
Finland 1 0.23 17 0.35
France 10 2.33 129 2.66
Germany 6 1.40 94 1.94
Greece 4 0.93 32 0.66
Hong Kong 12 2.80 148 3.05
India 34 7.93 323 6.65
Indonesia 4 0.93 12 0.25
Israel 2 0.47 18 0.37
Italy 12 2.80 144 2.97
Japan 12 2.80 184 3.79
Jordan 2 0.47 28 0.58
Kenya 2 0.47 23 0.47
Luxembourg 1 0.23 10 0.21
Malaysia 3 0.70 50 1.03
New Zealand 7 1.63 41 0.84
Norway 1 0.23 17 0.35
(Continued)
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Table 1. Continued
Panel B: Traditional energy (electricity) ﬁrms
Firms Observations
Country N % N %
Pakistan 15 3.50 118 2.43
Peru 7 1.63 69 1.42
Philippines 8 1.86 108 2.22
Portugal 2 0.47 28 0.58
Singapore 2 0.47 16 0.33
South Korea 3 0.70 37 0.76
Spain 7 1.63 79 1.63
Sri Lanka 3 0.70 29 0.60
Sweden 3 0.70 21 0.43
Switzerland 8 1.86 96 1.98
Thailand 16 3.73 116 2.39
Turkey 7 1.63 64 1.32
UK 9 2.10 74 1.52
USA 46 10.72 588 12.11
Venezuela 1 0.23 12 0.25
Total 429 100 4,854 100
for 36.86% of the full sample. Germany and China
are ranked second, with 22 ﬁrms each, while
Australia has 17 and the UK has 12. Advanced
economies have more RE ﬁrms than emerging
markets, although countries such as India and
Brazil have made unprecedently large RE invest-
ments in the last 2 years, becoming the leading in-
vestors among developing countries (Bloomberg,
2018), albeit having many fewer active RE ﬁrms.
This disparate pattern between the two groups
is largely attributable to the fact that emerging
markets have less developed ﬁnancial systems and
poorer infrastructure, as well as lacking skills and
social awareness.
A fundamental premise of our argument is that
renewable energy development is inﬂuenced by the
nature of a legal regime whose precepts constrain
the decisions of governments, banks, investors and
other stakeholders. To examine this relationship,
we classify countries depending on whether they
have a common law regime or a civil law regime.
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) suggest that there are
several subgroups displaying the common charac-
teristics of civil law jurisdictions. These are, speciﬁ-
cally, of German, French and Scandinavian origin,
and what are classiﬁed as the socialist system, but
which is subsumed into the civil law tradition for
want of adequate data (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer, 2008). Although these branches fol-
low similar basic principles, there are clear differ-
ences between them, which can have a signiﬁcant
impact on the underlying relationship. We note, in
particular, that the Scandinavian countries have a
stronger centralized system of civil law than others
in our sample; apart from China, which is a com-
mand economy that has recently begun to adopt
market principles. Thus, following Liang and Ren-
neboog (2017) andLa Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and
Shleifer (2008), we classify legal traditions within
the civil law system into four divisions: French ori-
gin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and what
we term the Chinese civil law system, to account
for regime heterogeneity and possible inﬂuence on
the trajectory of RE investment (see Table 2 for
details).
Empirical models
Sustainable investment in RE is the primary force
driving sector development. RE ﬁrms need ﬁnance
to fund investment in order to survive and grow.
Finance theories posit that ﬁrms’ investment ex-
penditure may be constrained by a lack of inter-
nally generated funds when information asymme-
try occurs. The pecking order hypothesis supports
a model of the hierarchy of ﬁnancing, which as-
serts that cash ﬂow is an important determinant
of a ﬁrm’s ﬁxed investment, and that asymmetric
information is considerably greater for new, high-
risk ﬁrms than for stable, mature ﬁrms that offer
safer ﬁxed investments. Consequently, the cost of
Table 2. Legal origin of the countries in the study
Legal system Sample countries
Common law countries Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Israel, New Zealand, Singapore,
Thailand, UK, USA
Civil law countries Scandinavian origin Denmark, Norway, Sweden
French origin France, Italy, Spain
German origin Germany, Japan, South Korea
Chinese origin China
Sources: La Porta et al. (1997); Liang and Renneboog (2017).
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external funds will necessarily be higher for RE in-
vestment than for TE investment. Fazzari, Hub-
bard and Petersen (1988), among many others,
show that constrained ﬁrms are sensitive to inter-
nal cash ﬂow while unconstrained ﬁrms are not,
and consider higher investment cash ﬂow sensitiv-
ities as evidence of greater ﬁnancing constraints
(e.g. Bond et al., 2003; Cho, 1995; Mairesse, Hall
and Mulkay, 1999). Many studies contend that
cash ﬂow represents potential sensitivity of invest-
ment to ﬂuctuations in available internal ﬁnance,
after investment opportunities are controlled for
(Carpenter, 2005; Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen,
1988). We therefore use cash ﬂow from operations,
CFi,t, as a proxy for ﬁnancial constraints.
The empirical literature argues that a ﬁrm’s ﬁ-
nancial structure provides robust and quantita-
tively important explanatory variables for invest-
ment at the ﬁrm level (Gilchrist and Himmelberg,
1995). To take account of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial struc-
ture in the investment cash ﬂow sensitivity rela-
tionship, we explicitly incorporate variables rep-
resenting the ﬁnancial structure into the model,
namely cash holdings, Cashi,t, and total debt level,
Leveri,t. Further, to account for country-speciﬁc
economic conditions, two macroeconomic vari-
ables, the annual growth rate of GDP, Dgdp, and
the log of GNI per capita, lngniper, of each coun-
try are added to the regression. The growth rate
of GDP indicates that better economic conditions
may stimulate investments. GNI per capita reﬂects
state income levels, since higher income levels may
offer fertile ground for the government or other in-
stitutions to support a new industry in a marginal
sector. The two measures capture wealth effects
from the differing perspectives of individual coun-
tries, reﬂecting the predisposition of their citizens
to support the sustainability agenda4 (Liang and
Renneboog, 2017), and also the level of protections
afforded to shareholders and creditors (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008).
To estimate the hypothesized relationships, we
adapt the investment function in the reduced form
(Carpenter, 2005; Devereux and Schiantarelli,
1989; Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson, 1988). The
4Laing and Renneboog (2017) argue that people living
in rich countries, with high individual incomes, are more
likely to support a sustainability agenda; whereas people
living in poorer countries, with low individual incomes,
will be more concerned with their ‘ . . . daily economic sur-
vival’.
baseline cash ﬂow investment model is speciﬁed
below:
(
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
)
= β1
(
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ f
(
Xi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ g (Mi,t) + εi,t (1)
where Ii,t represents ﬁrm i’s investment in ﬁxed as-
sets in year t; CFi,t is ﬁrm i’s internal cash ﬂow
in year t; Xi,t is a vector of ﬁrm characteristics
comprising ﬁrm i’s capital structure, represented
by cash holding and total debt, and ﬁrm size; and
εi,t is an errorerm. To reduce heteroscedasticity, the
ﬁnancial variables are scaled by the book value of
total assets at the beginning of the period, Ki,t−1.
Mi,t is a vector of macroeconomic variables, in-
cluding annual growth rate of GDP, Dgdp, and log
GNI per capita, lngniper, in each country.
Q investment model. The ﬁnance literature is con-
sistent in the view that ﬁrm investment is market-
driven behaviour and should be responsive to
growth opportunities (Fazzari, Hubbard and Pe-
tersen, 1988). The Q-investment model has been
used extensively in empirical studies of the rela-
tionship between corporate investment and ﬁrm
growth. Tobin’s Q assesses the market valuation of
a company’s capital compared to the replacement
cost of the underlying assets, and is often used as a
proxy to represent ﬁrms’ future investment oppor-
tunities (Bolton, Chen and Wang, 2011; Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen, 2000; Gilchrist and Him-
melberg, 1995; Summers et al., 1981). Despite the
recognized difficulties in empirically implementing
the Q ratio (Blanchard and Fischer, 1990), Q is a
forward-looking variable capturing the ramiﬁca-
tions of ﬁnancial market frictions that impinge on
the ﬁrm in all its decisions (Chirinko, 1993).We ex-
tend the investment function by including Tobin’s
Q to account for future investment opportunities.
The investment equation is thus speciﬁed below:
(
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
)
= β1
(
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ β2Qi,t + f
(
Xi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ g (Mi,t) + εi,t (2)
where Qi,t is Tobin’s Q, which is measured by
the ratio of a ﬁrm’s market capitalization and to-
tal liabilities over total assets at the beginning of
year t.
Extended cash ﬂow investment model: the role of a
legal system. Finance theories propose that the
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ﬁnancial system determines a ﬁrm’s access to ﬁ-
nancial resources and hence its investment deci-
sions (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991). The
legal origin of a country can potentially affect the
ﬁrm’s investment decision, subject to its ﬁnancial
state (H1) and its expectations of the prospects of
growth (H2). To test the hypotheses, we incorpo-
rate the legal origin of the country where a ﬁrm
operates by means of an interaction between legal
origin and cash ﬂow, Englishi × CFi,t, into Eq. (3);
and an interaction between legal origin and
Tobin’s Q, Englishi × Qi,t, into Eq. (4). The aug-
mented investment equations are thus speciﬁed be-
low:
(
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
)
= β1
(
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ β2Qi,t + β3Englishi
×
(
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ f
(
Xi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ g (Mi,t) + εi,t (3)
(
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
)
= β1
(
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ β2Qi,t + β4Englishi
×Qi,t + f
(
Xi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ g (Mi,t) + εi,t (4)
where legal origin, Englishi, is equal to one if ﬁrm
i is registered in a common law country, or zero
otherwise. Equations (3) and (4) will be examined
using the full sample with the interactions of the
common law system and each of the four sub-civil
law systems with cash ﬂow and Tobin’s Q, respec-
tively. We expect that β3 in Eq. (3) and β4 in Eq. (4)
will be positive, if H1 and H2 are supported.
Extended cash ﬂow investment model: the role of
national governance. Next, to test for the impact
of national governance, we use three country-level
governance variables to measure the inﬂuence of
enforcement and accountability on market forces
and social preferences that determine levels of RE
investment. TheWorld Bank maintains a database
of Worldwide Governance Indicators, which mea-
sure governance characteristics exhibited by differ-
ent countries. We adopt the method after Liang
and Renneboog (2017), and consider three vari-
ables: regulatory quality; rule of law; voice and
accountability, because of their relevance to the
governance characteristics exhibited by the legal
systems that we examine for the purpose of this
study. Regulatory quality measures the ability of
a government’s policies and regulations to stimu-
late the development of the private sector and how
the attributes of the former might differ between
the laissez-faire market systems of common law
countries and the centralized and bureaucratic sys-
tems of civil law countries. Rule of law determines,
inter alia, the degree to which actors have conﬁ-
dence in, and conform to, the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights and the authority of
the courts, and discriminates between the adversar-
ial nature of legal systems in common law coun-
tries and the inquisitorial nature of legal systems
in civil law countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer, 2008). Voice and accountability cap-
tures the perception of the rights of a nation’s cit-
izens to take part in elections, exercise freedom of
expression, freely associate at a societal level and
have access to an objective media in different legal
regimes.
Arguably, our sample incorporates the inﬂuence
of two signiﬁcantly divergent legal systems, repre-
sented, on the one hand, by a common law system’s
laissez-faire, market-led entrepreneurship and, on
the other hand, by China’s distinctive brand of
command economy capitalism. The differences be-
tween these two systems, standing at either end
of a continuum of countries that fall within these
two extremes, suggests signiﬁcant disparities be-
tween systems of national governance practices
that may give rise to distinctive investment be-
haviours. A system of governance is character-
ized by the nature of the regulation imposed, the
strength and impartiality of the law that enforces
it, and the ability of citizens to intervene in the pro-
cess by democratic means. Accountability and en-
forcement, represented by regulatory quality, rule
of law, and voice and accountability, effectively
measure the propensity of government to intervene
in society and the behaviour of its economic agents.
To assess the varying effects of country-level gov-
ernance, we interact the three country-level gover-
nance variables with cash ﬂow, GVi × CFi,t, and
Tobin’s Q, GVi × Qi,t, and test for a possible joint
effect for each of the ﬁve legal regimes, in the in-
vestment functions below:
(
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
)
= β1
(
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ β2Qi,t + β5GVi
×
(
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ f
(
Xi,t
Ki,t−1
)
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+ g (Mi,t) + εi,t (5)
(
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
)
= β1
(
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ β2Qi,t + β6GVi
×Qi,t + f
(
Xi,t
Ki,t−1
)
+ g (Mi,t) + εi,t (6)
where GVi represents three country-level gov-
ernance variables, namely regulatory quality
(Reg q), rule of law (Rule l), and voice and ac-
countability (V&A). Equations (5) and (6) will be
examined using the common law sample and four
civil law sub-samples. We expect that β5 in Eq. (5)
and β6 in Eq. (6) will be positive, if H3a and H3b
are supported.
We adopt the ordinary least squares (OLS)
model in performing the estimations to assess the
validity of the three hypotheses. First, we test H1
and H2 in the baseline regressions. Second, we
expand the thesis with reference to the extent to
which the legal system prevailing in a jurisdiction
inﬂuences anREﬁrm’s investment decision. Third,
we determine the effect of national governance on
ﬁrm investment by interacting the three national
governance measures with cash ﬂow and Tobin’s
Q, respectively. Finally, to ensure the robustness
of the results and to address endogeneity, we per-
form a check using generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM) estimations.
To account for the dependence of observations
within a ﬁrm over time, robust standard errors
will be estimated and clustered at the ﬁrm level
(Arellano, 1987; White, 1980). Further, we con-
duct diagnostic tests on multicollinearity in our
regressions. The presence of multicollinearity
among independent variables can inﬂate standard
errors, which may result in less efficient param-
eter estimates. To assess this possibility, we con-
duct two tests of multicollinearity. First, we check
correlations among the independent variables us-
ing the Pearson correlation test (see Table A1 in
the Supporting Information). The values range be-
tween 0.01 and 0.67, with none exceeding the 0.80
threshold. Second, we conduct a variance inﬂation
factor (VIF) test (see Table A2 in the Support-
ing Information). The values range between 1.27
and 6.00, and none is above the VIF threshold of
10 (O’Brien, 2007), with an average VIF of 3.68.
These two tests justify our conﬁdence in the fact
that multicollinearity is not a problem in our re-
gressions.
Table 3 provides detailed deﬁnitions of the vari-
ables, including ﬁrm-level investment and ﬁnan-
cial condition, legal system variables, national
governance measurements and macroeconomic
variables.
Summary of statistics
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of our samples
for the regression analyses, which show distinctive
differences in both RE and TE investment across
the legal systems.With respect to the renewable en-
ergy sector, Panel A shows that themedian value of
the RE investment ratio is 3.36% for the full sam-
ple. The median investment ratio of the civil law
system is 4.51%, signiﬁcantly higher than the me-
dian in common law systems, which is 2.71%. This
clearly indicates that investment in RE in civil law
countries is proportionately twice as high as invest-
ment in common law countries. Within the civil
law systems, China has the highest investment ra-
tio of all (7.56%), followed by German countries
(4.22%), French countries (3.56%) and Scandina-
vian countries (3.32%). It must be noted, however,
that China’s RE investment levels have been sig-
niﬁcantly augmented by surges in investment since
2015 (Zhang et al., 2016). With respect to the tra-
ditional energy sector, Panel B shows that the me-
dian value of the TE investment ratio is 5.69% for
the full sample. Common law countries have a rela-
tively higher median investment ratio (6.09%) than
civil law countries (5.40%). Within civil law sys-
tems, China has made by far the greatest invest-
ment at 7.54%, compared to investment in French
countries (4.91%), German countries (4.79%) and
Scandinavian countries (3.41%).
Overall, TE investment remains higher than
RE investment across all legal systems, and the
biggest difference is observed in English legal sys-
tem countries, with 6.09% (TE) as opposed to
2.71% (RE). Civil law systems display lower dif-
ferences, with Scandinavia standing at 3.41% (TE)
to 3.32% (RE); French countries at 4.91% (TE) to
3.56% (RE); German countries at 4.79% (TE) to
4.22% (RE); and China at 7.54% (TE) to 7.56%
(RE). Clearly, English legal system countries’ in-
vestment in RE is less than half their investment
in TE. Conversely, civil law countries in general
are approaching, or have reached, a rough bal-
ance between investment in RE and TE sources.
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Table 3. Variable deﬁnitions
Measure Variable Deﬁnition
Investment I Capital expenditures/total assets at the beginning of the period
Total assets K Book value of total assets
Growth prospects Q Tobin’s Q: (market capitalization + total liabilities)/total assets at the beginning of
the period
Cash ﬂow CF Net cash ﬂow operating activities/total assets at the beginning of the period
Cash holding Cash Cash & equivalents generic/total assets at the beginning of the period
Total debt Lever Total liabilities/total assets at the beginning of the period
Total sales Sale Operating income/total assets at the beginning of the period
Return on equity ROE Net income/shareholder’s equity
Firm size Size Log (total assets + 1)
GDP growth rate Ggdp Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local
currency (aggregates are based on constant 2010 US dollars)
GNI per capital lngniper Log (GNI per capita) (PPP, current international $, US dollars)
Legal system English English origin: a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is registered in a
common law country, and 0 otherwise
Scandinavian Scandinavian origin: a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is registered in
a Scandinavian civil law country, and 0 otherwise
French French origin: a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is registered in a
French civil law country, and 0 otherwise
German German origin: a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is registered in a
German civil law country, and 0 otherwise
China Chinese origin: a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is registered in a
Chinese civil law country, and 0 otherwise
National governance
Regulatory quality Reg q Regulatory quality measures perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote
private-sector development. Estimates give the country’s score on the aggregate
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution (i.e. ranging from
approximately −2.5 to 2.5).
Rule of law Rule l Rule of law measures perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence. Estimates give the country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a
standard normal distribution (i.e. ranging from approximately −2.5 to 2.5).
Voice and
accountability
V&A Voice and accountability measures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of
expression, freedom of association and a free media. Estimates give the country’s
score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution (i.e.
ranging from approximately −2.5 to 2.5).
Notes:Firm-level ﬁnancial data are obtained fromDatastream; national governance data are obtained from theWorld BankWorldwide
Governance Indicators.
Scandinavian countries’ investment in the two en-
ergy sources almost match, while German coun-
tries are also approaching parity between the two
sources, with French countries appearing to lag
behind. Most interesting amongst these statistics,
though, is that China dominates in both RE and
TE investment, virtually reaching par.
In respect of ﬁnancial attributes, RE and TE
ﬁrms display distinctive differences. RE ﬁrms
have negative cash ﬂow (−3.57%), negative sales
(−2.92%), negative ROE (−7.31%) and a much
lower debt level (44.96%) in comparison to TE
ﬁrms (60.98%), while having a similar Q ratio of
1.39 (RE) to 1.13 (TE). Further, REﬁrms aremuch
smaller in size (12.22%) in comparison to TE ﬁrms
(15.86%). These statistics are clear evidence that
RE ﬁrms are loss-making, have worse ﬁnancial
conditions and receive much less external debt ﬁ-
nance compared to their peers in the TE sector.
In respect of national governance, quality in
common law systems appears to be higher than
in civil law systems, based on the three gover-
nance measures. However, closer scrutiny of the
subgroup ﬁgures reveals that the lower scores for
the civil law group are generated wholly by China’s
contribution, which is negative across all three
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Table 4. Summary of statistics
Panel A: Renewable energy sector
Variables N Mean Median Min Max SD
I (%) 1,665 9.7545 3.3641 0.0000 114.4341 18.0046
English 1,665 0.6306 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4828
Scandinavian 1,665 0.0420 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2007
French 1,665 0.0468 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2114
German 1,665 0.1748 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3799
China 1,665 0.1057 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3076
Q 1,665 3.2546 1.3918 0.3808 76.1120 8.1244
CF (%) 1,665 −8.4578 −3.5752 −43.5730 48.1389 20.5520
Cash (%) 1,665 36.6961 19.5615 0.0098 253.8272 52.5078
Lever (%) 1,665 45.4386 44.9585 9.2836 101.7318 26.1742
Sale (%) 1,665 −29.8732 −2.9231 −797.6190 50.5407 106.5097
ROE (%) 1,665 −44.1630 −7.3100 −369.7700 81.0800 94.4872
Size 1,665 12.4046 12.2175 3.4965 23.0374 3.2676
Ggdp (%) 1,665 2.7590 2.4511 −5.6189 15.2404 2.8281
lngniper 1,665 10.4673 10.6310 7.6686 11.2018 0.5778
Median difference tests on investment
I (%)
Common
law system
Civil law
system Scandinavian French German China
N 1,050 615 70 78 291 176
Median 2.7087 4.5066 3.3183 3.5598 4.2232 7.5622
Median test −1.7979*** −0.6096 −0.8511** −1.5145** −4.8535***
National governance (median)
Common
law system
Civil law
system Scandinavian French German China
Reg q 1.6078 1.1571 1.7984 1.0703 1.5361 −0.2645
(0.4842) (0.7984) (0.1570) (0.1761) (0.2785) (0. 0591)
Rule l 1.6381 1.4131 1.9660 1.1683 1.6392 −0.4145
(0.4274) (0.9397) (0.0514) (0.3046) (0.2921) (0.0954)
V&A 1.1336 1.1355 1.5768 1.1225 1.3368 −1.6314
(0.4313) (1.3209) (0.0693) (0.0808) (0.2862) (0.0660)
Panel B: Traditional energy sector (electricity)
Variables N Mean Median Min Max SD
I (%) 4,854 9.2336 5.6941 0.0000 114.4341 14.1332
English 4,854 0.4139 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4926
Scandinavian 4,854 0.0144 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.1192
French 4,854 0.2868 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4523
German 4,854 0.0900 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2863
China 4,854 0.1949 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3962
Q 4,854 1.4106 1.1302 0.3808 76.1120 2.2385
CF (%) 4,854 6.4128 7.0742 −43.5730 48.1389 10.7966
Cash (%) 4,854 12.7151 6.1358 0.0098 253.8272 25.5079
Lever (%) 4,854 56.8393 60.9831 9.2836 101.7318 20.8121
Sale (%) 4,854 2.6298 4.9974 −797.6190 50.5407 33.1812
ROE (%) 4,854 2.5755 8.2800 −369.7700 81.0800 40.7566
Size 4,854 15.8584 15.8613 3.5553 23.0374 3.0201
Ggdp (%) 4,854 4.1639 3.2651 −10.8945 18.2866 3.7454
lngniper 4,854 9.8126 9.8658 7.5909 11.4139 0.8803
(Continued)
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Table 4. Continued
Median difference tests on investment
I (%)
Common
law system
Civil law
system Scandinavian French German China
N 2,009 2,845 70 1,392 437 946
Median 6.0873 5.3963 3.4148 4.9122 4.7897 7.5363
Median test 0.6910 2.6725*** 1.1751*** 1.2976*** −1.4490***
National governance (median)
Common
law system
Civil law
system Scandinavian French German China
Reg q 1.4929 0.0939 1.8034 0.3995 1.4281 −0.2408
(0.9613) (0. 7525) (0.1732) (0.6731) (0.3049) (0.0835)
Rule l 1.5961 −0.2318 1.9606 0.0441 1.6015 −0.4648
(0.9303) (0.8949) (0.0492) (0.7719) (0.2883) (0.0967)
V&A 1.0972 0.4505 1.5716 0.5371 1.1096 −1.6314
(0.7510) (1.2229) (0.0792) (0.5257) (0.2741) (0.0831)
Notes:Financial data have been winsorized at the 1% level to remove outliers. The standard deviations of national governancemeasures
are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
measures. When discounting China, Scandinavia’s
score becomes the highest of all the groups, which
accords with the ﬁndings of Liang and Renneboog
(2017). We note also that German legal origin
countries score higher than French legal origin
countries. Both energy groups follow the same
trends, and it transpires that governance standards
are much higher in RE ﬁrms because they operate
mainly in countries with higher ratings than those
countries where TE ﬁrms trade.
Empirical results and discussions
Table 5 reports the baseline regression results of
RE investment. Table 6 presents the results of TE
investment. Table 7 presents the joint effect of
country-level governance with cash ﬂow on invest-
ment. Table 8 presents the joint effect of country-
level governance with Tobin’s Q on investment.
Table 9 presents the results of RE investment, ex-
cluding investment in China, and Table 10 presents
GMM results, for robustness.
Baseline regressions
Table 5 show that the ﬁve investment models pro-
duce generally expected results. The coefficients on
Tobin’s Q are positive, although insigniﬁcant in
most cases. As expected, cash holdings have a pos-
itive impact on RE investment in all regressions,
indicating that a higher level of cash holding in-
creases investment, which is consistent with the
pecking-order hypothesis that ﬁrms prefer to in-
vest using internal funds. ROE and leverage are
signiﬁcant and positive in all cases, indicating that
ﬁrms with a higher level of ROE and leverage tend
to make more investments.
Investment cash ﬂow sensitivity. The results of
greatest interest are those generated by the inter-
action terms, and they generally conﬁrm our hy-
potheses 1 and 2. With respect to investment cash
ﬂow sensitivity, cash ﬂow has a positive impact
on investment in common law countries (0.1072,
p < 0.10), as Model R2 shows. This conﬁrms H1
that RE ﬁrms in a common law system face ﬁ-
nancial constraints, supporting our argument that
the risk intrinsic to RE projects increases the aver-
sion of ﬁnancial providers to such investments and
hence ﬁrms’ sensitivity to cash ﬂow. This is consis-
tent with our contention that government support
in the form of subsidies and other forms of eco-
nomic relief in common law countries is relatively
lower, less certain and more likely to be reduced
or curtailed, as echoed by Pearson and Watson
(2012). When external funds cannot be a perfect
substitute for internal funds, since they are avail-
able only at a high premium due to the presence
of transaction costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984),
dynamic RE ﬁrms face a ﬁnancial gap in their
investment activities and are less able to under-
take RE projects to achieve the economies of scale
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Table 5. Baseline regression results: renewable energy investment
Models
Variables R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
English*CF 0.1072*
(0.0535)
English*Q 0.9322**
(0.3348)
Scandinavian*CF −0.1125
(0.0773)
French*CF −0.1185
(0.1016)
German*CF −0.1319**
(0.0494)
China*CF 0.0393
(0.0537)
Scandinavian*Q −1.1150***
(0.2996)
French*Q −0.6034
(0.4049)
German*Q −0.9836*
(0.5231)
China*Q −0.7774
(0.7818)
Q −0.0406 −0.0306 −0.9678*** −0.0299 −0.0351
(0.0419) (0.0418) (0.3090) (0.0417) (0.0459)
CF 0.0462 −0.0246 0.0469 0.0801 0.0460
(0.0494) (0.0353) (0.0482) (0.0549) (0.0496)
Cash 0.0874*** 0.0870*** 0.0924*** 0.0869*** 0.0922***
(0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0115) (0.0130)
Lever 0.0800** 0.0783** 0.0835** 0.0787** 0.0825**
(0.0297) (0.0299) (0.0296) (0.0301) (0.0291)
Sale −0.0392*** −0.0405*** −0.0381*** −0.0404*** −0.0381***
(0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0073)
ROE 0.0191* 0.0187* 0.0189* 0.0190* 0.0186*
(0.0096) (0.0098) (0.0095) (0.0099) (0.0095)
Size 0.2765 0.2502 0.3181 0.2596 0.3334
(0.3192) (0.3150) (0.3064) (0.3137) (0.3211)
Ggdp 0.2082 0.1963 0.2438 0.1664 0.2312
(0.2525) (0.2530) (0.2677) (0.2597) (0.3482)
lngniper −0.7267 −0.8302 −1.1237 −0.7947 −0.9943
(1.3609) (1.3209) (1.0854) (1.3653) (1.1761)
Constant 9.1211 10.7343 12.8747 10.3032 11.4359
(15.5766) (15.2768) (12.5556) (15.7412) (13.8250)
Year effect control control control control control
N 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,665
R2 0.162 0.165 0.166 0.166 0.166
Notes: This table reports the baseline regression results for testing H1 and H2. Models T1 to T5 are estimated using OLS. English is
a dummy variable that denotes a system of common law legal origin. Scandinavian, French, German and China are dummy variables
that denote four subgroups of a system of civil law legal origin. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level and reported in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable deﬁnitions are given in
Table 3.
that would increase their ability to compete in the
market.
Conversely, the coefficients on cash ﬂow for all
subgroups of the civil law system are negative with
different levels of signiﬁcance, as Model R4 shows.
RE ﬁrms in civil law countries face lower ﬁnancial
constraints than their counterparts in common law
countries. Among the four subgroups, countries of
German origin contribute most to this observed
effect (−0.1319, p < 0.05), which is consistent
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Table 6. Regression results: traditional energy investment
Models
Variables T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
English*CF 0.1433*
(0.0808)
English*Q 0.7494**
(0.3492)
Scandinavian*CF −0.8885*
(0.4834)
French*CF −0.1389
(0.0875)
German*CF −0.2203***
(0.0720)
China*CF −0.0698
(0.0953)
Scandinavian*Q −1.0317
(3.6032)
French*Q −0.5566*
(0.3184)
German*Q −3.2336***
(0.7968)
China*Q −0.8876
(0.5276)
Q −0.1020 −0.0610 −0.5813** −0.0619 0.1158
(0.1097) (0.1148) (0.2704) (0.1138) (0.2120)
CF 0.0692* 0.0023 0.0775* 0.1442** 0.0738*
(0.0407) (0.0587) (0.0408) (0.0605) (0.0402)
Cash 0.1977*** 0.2020*** 0.1985*** 0.2018*** 0.1992***
(0.0279) (0.0290) (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0279)
Lever 0.0982*** 0.0971*** 0.0976*** 0.0960*** 0.0977***
(0.0261) (0.0273) (0.0259) (0.0277) (0.0260)
Sale 0.0081 0.0071 0.0161 0.0068 0.0147
(0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0122) (0.0138)
ROE 0.0006 −0.0010 0.0029 −0.0007 0.0025
(0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0080)
Size −0.2859** −0.2982** −0.2988** −0.2759** −0.2296*
(0.1233) (0.1202) (0.1154) (0.1226) (0.1137)
Ggdp 0.2644* 0.2781** 0.2870** 0.2230 0.3077**
(0.1440) (0.1314) (0.1265) (0.1366) (0.1194)
lngniper −0.6989 −0.7795 −0.7445 −0.6703 −0.4117
(0.8909) (0.8441) (0.8295) (0.8635) (0.8228)
Constant 10.5815 11.5482 11.1556 10.4137 7.3200
(8.6776) (8.3258) (8.1759) (8.5159) (8.2411)
Year effect control control control control control
N 4854 4854 4854 4854 4854
R2 0.133 0.136 0.136 0.140 0.140
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the traditional energy (electricity) sector following the same procedure as Table 5.
Models T1 to T5 are estimated usingOLS. English is a dummy variable that denotes a system of common law legal origin. Scandinavian,
French, German andChina are dummy variables that denote four subgroups of a system of civil law legal origin. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the ﬁrm level and reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. Variable deﬁnitions are given in Table 3.
with the evidence that RE investment in German
civil law countries is the highest among the civil
law grouping, as reported in Panel B of Table 4.
Arguably, this is due partly to ﬁscal support and
partly to the availability of bank ﬁnance for RE
development. In Germany, electricity from renew-
able sources is mainly supported through a market
premium scheme and FiTs (RES Legal, 2017). In
addition, bank-based investment supported by
low interest rates predominates in the German
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Table 7. Regression results: the impact of national governance on investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity
Common law system Civil law system
Variables GC1 GC2 GC3 GC1 GC2 GC3
Reg q*CF 0.1278 −0.1686***
(0.0862) (0.0511)
Reg q 2.6191 0.8818
(1.7193) (2.5459)
Rule l*CF −0.0236 −0.1228*
(0.0918) (0.0562)
Rule l 3.9675 0.8679
(4.1014) (3.6918)
V&A*CF −0.1990 −0.1098***
(0.1492) (0.0253)
V&A 2.1113 −1.2469
(1.8534) (1.8444)
Q −0.0143 0.0050 0.0094 −0.7184 −0.8166 −0.9249
(0.0396) (0.0576) (0.0599) (0.5147) (0.5406) (0.5606)
CF −0.1065 0.1295 0.3185 0.1370** 0.0953 0.0311
(0.1133) (0.1546) (0.1997) (0.0426) (0.0623) (0.0402)
Cash 0.0874*** 0.0857*** 0.0836*** 0.1073*** 0.1068*** 0.1090***
(0.0170) (0.0159) (0.0139) (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0218)
Lever 0.0959** 0.0978** 0.0997** 0.0658 0.0647 0.0698
(0.0379) (0.0382) (0.0397) (0.0519) (0.0512) (0.0513)
Sale −0.0405*** −0.0411*** −0.0410*** −0.0455 −0.0447 −0.0434
(0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0404) (0.0412) (0.0418)
ROE 0.0160 0.0156 0.0155 0.0420*** 0.0412*** 0.0419***
(0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0120)
Size 0.7116* 0.9134* 0.9896** 0.1625 0.1588 0.0982
(0.3640) (0.4269) (0.3754) (0.2590) (0.2594) (0.2414)
Ggdp 0.4140 0.4653 0.5890 0.0901 0.1014 0.1004
(0.6124) (0.5611) (0.5000) (0.3785) (0.3779) (0.3778)
lngniper −2.1484 −2.6274 −0.0595 −2.8573 −3.1338 0.7098
(1.5906) (2.9387) (0.6714) (3.3217) (5.2835) (3.9809)
Constant 8.4769 8.7121 −13.4643 30.7452 33.7107 −1.5339
(13.5704) (22.5328) (10.8481) (31.3889) (46.7933) (38.9033)
Year effect control control control control control control
N 955 955 955 546 546 546
R2 0.195 0.194 0.198 0.229 0.225 0.231
Notes: This table reports the regression results of the effects of national governance on the investment-cash ﬂow relationship. Models
GC1 to GC3 are estimated using OLS. Reg q, Rule l and V&A signify regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability, re-
spectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level and reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable deﬁnitions are given in Table 3.
jurisdiction (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; RES Legal,
2017), as it does in other civil law countries (Allen,
Carletti and Marquez, 2015; Magill, Quinzii and
Rochet, 2015). As Fama (1985) maintains, the
close connection between a bank and its clients
gives the former access to inside information,
not publicly available, which enables it to scruti-
nize management performance and ensure that
investors’ interests are being best served. Such
close monitoring makes banks aware of liquidity
problems at an early stage of RE project develop-
ment and facilitates swift action to obviate failure
and losses to investors. This organic involvement
helps to reduce banks’ credit risk, encouraging
them to advance funds for RE projects and hence
diminishing ﬁrms’ sensitivity to cash ﬂow in their
investment.
Investment Q sensitivity. With respect to invest-
ment Q sensitivity, the coefficient on the interac-
tion terms, Englishi × Qi,t, is positive and signiﬁ-
cant (0.9322, p < 0.05), as Model R3 shows. The
result supports H2, that the strong legal system in
a common law jurisdiction creates a high degree of
transparency, exposes managers’ decisions to pub-
lic scrutiny and obliges them to seek investments
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Table 8. Regression results: the impact of national governance on investment-Q sensitivity
Common law system Civil law system
Variables GQ1 GQ2 GQ3 GQ1 GQ2 GQ3
Reg q*CF 0.2699 −0.4755
(0.2976) (0.5142)
Reg q 1.0779 1.1752
(1.7129) (3.0706)
Rule l*CF 0.2318 −0.5022
(0.7721) (0.4554)
Rule l 3.6298 0.4619
(3.6612) (3.7688)
V&A*CF 0.0333 −0.3117
(0.3348) (0.3055)
V&A 2.7383 −1.3397
(2.1885) (1.7884)
Q −0.4070 −0.3741 −0.0333 −0.2775 −0.2011 −0.6533
(0.4154) (1.2277) (0.3715) (0.3388) (0.4043) (0.3891)
CF 0.0883* 0.0911* 0.0903* −0.0678 −0.0688 −0.0670
(0.0476) (0.0487) (0.0484) (0.0602) (0.0586) (0.0586)
Cash 0.0864*** 0.0856*** 0.0851*** 0.1074*** 0.1069*** 0.1077***
(0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0149) (0.0229) (0.0223) (0.0222)
Lever 0.0988** 0.0974** 0.0960** 0.0600 0.0592 0.0633
(0.0385) (0.0383) (0.0392) (0.0473) (0.0476) (0.0476)
Sale −0.0407*** −0.0412*** −0.0411*** −0.0515 −0.0524 −0.0522
(0.0083) (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0411) (0.0414) (0.0416)
ROE 0.0166 0.0158 0.0154 0.0360*** 0.0356*** 0.0362***
(0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0098)
Size 0.7766** 0.9108* 0.9805** 0.1440 0.1355 0.0860
(0.3325) (0.4110) (0.3985) (0.2919) (0.2995) (0.2767)
Ggdp 0.4275 0.4601 0.5843 0.2198 0.2343 0.2056
(0.5811) (0.5560) (0.5322) (0.4255) (0.4108) (0.4144)
lngniper −1.1423 −2.6167 −0.4265 −1.7645 −0.5869 2.4331
(1.4439) (2.9210) (0.8594) (3.8580) (5.1496) (3.7986)
Constant 2.4851 9.2259 −9.3014 20.2620 9.4444 −18.0192
(11.7669) (22.7399) (12.1552) (36.0235) (45.3454) (37.2776)
Year effect control control control control control control
N 955 955 955 546 546 546
R2 0.193 0.194 0.194 0.214 0.216 0.216
Notes: This table reports the regression results of the effects of national governance on the investment-Q relationship. Models GQ1 to
GQ3 are estimated using OLS. Reg q, Rule l and V&A signify regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability, respectively.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level and reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable deﬁnitions are given in Table 3.
that promise positive returns within a reasonable
term.
Our interaction analyses of the civil law sub-
group countries in Model R5 generate mixed
results. Notably, Tobin’s Q for Scandinavia
(−1.1150, p < 0.01) and for Germany (−0.9836,
p < 0.10) is negative and signiﬁcant. It is, however,
insigniﬁcant for the French and Chinese legal
systems, although both coefficients are negative,
as expected. The evidence supporting H2 in
respect of civil law countries is derived principally
from the inﬂuence of the Scandinavian and, to a
lesser extent, German legal jurisdictions. These
results provide sufficient evidence to conﬁrm our
argument that RE investment in civil law countries
is supported by an ethos that is conducive to social
wealth creation and the fulﬁlment of ESG ideals.
As we have argued, the system of social democracy
throughout Scandinavia appears to be more inter-
ventionist than in other countries in the civil law
grouping, and national policies and governance
structures drive themove towards RE deployment,
withmunicipalities and cities taking amajor role in
such developments. TheNordic bloc is pursuing an
aggressive programme to replace fossil fuels with
green sources of energy, driven by subsidization
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Table 9. Regression results: renewable energy investment excluding investment in China
Models
Variables D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
English*CF 0.1079*
(0.0561)
English*Q 0.8737*
(0.4560)
Scandinavian*CF −0.0911
(0.0958)
French*CF −0.1192
(0.0923)
German*CF −0.1158**
(0.0485)
Scandinavian*Q −1.3440***
(0.3186)
French*Q 0.0997
(0.7060)
German*Q −0.6564
(0.6745)
Q −0.0466 −0.0362 −0.9182** −0.0364 −0.0429
(0.0415) (0.0405) (0.4254) (0.0404) (0.0430)
CF 0.0326 −0.0411 0.0308 0.0675 0.0280
(0.0526) (0.0357) (0.0523) (0.0554) (0.0544)
Cash 0.0876*** 0.0871*** 0.0911*** 0.0873*** 0.0904***
(0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0144) (0.0136) (0.0142)
Lever 0.0744** 0.0725** 0.0782** 0.0722** 0.0741**
(0.0305) (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0300)
Sale −0.0376*** −0.0389*** −0.0369*** −0.0389*** −0.0367***
(0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0077)
ROE 0.0159* 0.0157 0.0155* 0.0156 0.0149
(0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0086)
Size 0.4263* 0.4013 0.4776* 0.4018 0.5049**
(0.2427) (0.2415) (0.2301) (0.2401) (0.2263)
Ggdp −0.0460 −0.0580 −0.1374 −0.0557 −0.1004
(0.4847) (0.5084) (0.4547) (0.5074) (0.4435)
lngniper 5.4780 4.9387 4.4313 5.0030 5.7047
(3.2326) (3.1500) (3.6721) (3.1702) (4.3734)
Constant −57.7959 −51.6661 −47.3651 −52.3366 −60.8548
(35.0252) (34.2668) (39.0101) (34.4255) (46.0830)
Year effect control control control control control
N 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427
R2 0.175 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.179
Notes: This table reports the regression results excluding investment in China following the same procedure as Table 5. Models D1 to
D5 are estimated using OLS. English is a dummy variable that denotes a system of common law legal origin. Scandinavian, French and
German are dummy variables that denote three subgroups of a system of civil law legal origin. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the ﬁrm level and reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable deﬁnitions are given in Table 3.
(Sovacool, 2017), which is strongly suggestive of
a political will to achieve carbon neutrality for the
beneﬁt of all. A benevolent social stance is also
adopted in Germany, which has been described as
a nation that practices ‘welfare capitalism’ (Dore,
2000) and fosters a corporate sector that serves a
wide range of stakeholders rather than focusing
primarily on shareholders’ needs (Adams, 1998).
The management of ﬁrms engaged in clean energy
production in such stakeholder economies, where
businesses and institutions contribute to the
creation of a cooperative environment (Strand,
Freeman and Hockerts, 2015), regard social
well-being as an important factor when selecting
ventures to adopt. Consequently, they are not
greatly inﬂuenced by stock market prices, and are
therefore less sensitive to projects’ prospects than
their counterparts in common law countries.
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Table 10. Dynamic GMM estimations: renewable energy investment
Models
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
English*CF 0.0686**
(0.0348)
English*Q 0.5724**
(0.2456)
Scandinavian*CF −0.4101**
(0.1627)
French*CF −0.0711
(0.1181)
German*CF −0.0539
(0.0751)
China*CF 0.1389
(0.1394)
Scandinavian*Q −4.0651***
(0.9592)
French*Q 3.1623
(2.3451)
German*Q 0.2962
(1.0792)
China*Q 0.0989
(1.0137)
L.Ii,t 0.3008*** 0.2904*** 0.3033*** 0.2884*** 0.2728***
(0.0789) (0.0175) (0.0106) (0.0807) (0.0779)
Q 0.3138 0.3027*** −0.2425 0.3043 0.3428
(0.2987) (0.1116) (0.2532) (0.3808) (0.3439)
CF 0.0056 −0.0339 0.0050 0.0282 −0.0134
(0.0469) (0.0258) (0.0103) (0.0572) (0.0497)
Cash 0.0485* 0.0517*** 0.0490*** 0.0490* 0.0348
(0.0270) (0.0084) (0.0056) (0.0265) (0.0236)
Lever 0.0509 0.0806*** 0.0500*** 0.0780 0.0792
(0.0567) (0.0214) (0.0128) (0.0510) (0.0526)
Sale −0.0299 −0.0309*** −0.0295*** −0.0308 −0.0341
(0.0193) (0.0061) (0.0032) (0.0201) (0.0208)
ROE −0.0125 −0.0053 −0.0125*** −0.0040 −0.0034
(0.0181) (0.0050) (0.0032) (0.0141) (0.0134)
Size 3.0485* 2.6821*** 3.1051*** 2.5499* 2.9541*
(1.6318) (0.4235) (0.2268) (1.3976) (1.5425)
Ggdp 0.2785 0.3268* 0.2623** 0.3406 0.1022
(0.4017) (0.1849) (0.1112) (0.3147) (0.4485)
lngniper −9.3719 −4.3420 −9.4260*** −4.3027 −3.7091
(8.3834) (2.9438) (2.0411) (5.8706) (9.3562)
Constant 57.5083 9.6010 57.7098*** 10.5221 −0.0034
(87.0598) (30.7993) (21.6590) (65.2207) (98.6860)
Year effect control control control control control
N 1,529 1,529 1,529 1,529 1,529
AR(2) 0.7345 0.7597 0.7670 0.8169 0.9636
Sargan test 0.2262 0.1576 0.2345 0.1987 0.2013
Notes: This table reports the regression results for dynamic investment models. Models M1 to M5 are estimated using Arellano and
Bond’s (1991) GMM approach. English is a dummy variable that denotes a system of common law legal origin. Scandinavian, French,
German and China are dummy variables that denote four subgroups of a system of civil law legal origin. L.Ii,t is the ﬁrst-order lag
value of investment. AR(2) tests for second-order serial correlation in disturbances. P-values of the Sargan test for overidentifying
restrictions, under the null of valid instruments, are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level and reported in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable deﬁnitions are given in
Table 3.
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It is noted that RE investment in China shows
no sensitivity to either cash ﬂow or Tobin’s Q,
though the coefficients are negative, as expected.
Certainly, this country is an enigma. Seen as one
of the world’s worst polluters, it has made consid-
erable investments in RE in recent years and is be-
coming the dominant force in global renewable en-
ergy (IEEFA, 2018). Arguably, this recent spurt in
investment should have begun to offset a scarcity
of RE investment in previous years, reducing sen-
sitivity, albeit not yet to a signiﬁcant level, as our
result shows. However, we recognize that it takes
time for such policy switching to generate relevant
and sufficient data from which justiﬁable conclu-
sions can be drawn. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer (2008) subsume socialist states into
the civil law grouping because of a paucity of data,
and China’s comparatively recent involvement in
RE developments has presented us with similar is-
sues, due to its shorter legacy.
Renewable energy investment versus traditional
energy investment
As shown in Table 5, our baseline regressions, in
general, support H1 and H2 in respect of RE in-
vestment. This empirical evidence, however, may
be representative of the nature of the energy in-
dustry as a whole rather than being a unique fea-
ture of the renewable energy sector itself. Although
its product, like theirs, is one of the primary in-
puts to the economy, companies in the RE sector
are distinctively different from other power com-
panies, since they are small, risky and prone to pe-
riodic slumps; have high start-up costs; and are un-
likely to generate positive returns until many years
have passed (Justice, 2009). Above all, RE com-
panies have a mission to improve the environment
and seek to achieve the ESG principles of respon-
sible investment. Their ability to do so, however,
depends on national policies to support their ac-
tivities. This renders RE investment highly sensi-
tive to changes in government policy determined
by strategic priorities and political considerations.5
To conﬁrm that our results in Table 5 are ascribable
to the RE sector, we conduct an analysis of the TE
sector, detecting a difference attributable to the dis-
5For example, China responded to the over-supply of elec-
tricity to the grid because of the rapid creation of wind-
farms by turning off turbines to limit windfarm produc-
tion to 85% of capacity (Harrabin, 2016).
criminative nature of RE investment. The results
are reported in Table 6.
It is evident that the results of investment in the
TE sector are, to a certain extent, different from
those of the baseline regressions for RE invest-
ment. Companies in Scandinavian civil law coun-
tries are less sensitive to cash ﬂow in their TE in-
vestment (−0.8885, p < 0.10) compared to RE
investment (−0.1125, p > 0.10). This may be ac-
counted for, in part, by Sweden’s continuing de-
pendence on nuclear energy for approximately 40%
of its electricity (Milne and Richard, 2016; World
Nuclear Association, 2019a), whose production
is supported by tax relief. Sweden’s government
has speciﬁcally removed a capacity tax, which ac-
counted for a quarter of the cost of nuclear power
in 2016, as a means of encouraging reduction of
its carbon footprint (IAEA, 2018). Finland also
generates 30% of its electricity from nuclear power
and plans to increase this to 60% before 2030 to
reduce its dependence on coal (World Nuclear As-
sociation, 2019b)6 and to help it achieve its car-
bon reduction targets by 2035. These are huge civil
engineering projects on a national scale, instigated
by governments, guaranteeing long-term, stable in-
come streams by means of subsidies, and thereby
reducing TE companies’ sensitivity to cash ﬂow.7
In respect of Q sensitivity within the TE sec-
tor, there are some identiﬁed differences in com-
parison to the RE sector. As expected, ﬁrm in-
vestment in a common law system is responsive
to growth prospects in TE investment (0.7494,
p < 0.05), although to a lesser extent in compar-
ison to RE investment (0.9322, p < 0.05). With re-
spect to civil law systems, investment in TE shows
6Four of Finland’s nuclear power stations will cease pro-
duction in 2027, 2030 and 2038, respectively. One new
reactor, the Okiluto 3, is predicted to come on stream
in 2019 and has a decommissioning date of 2075. Con-
struction of a second reactor, Hanihikiu 1, has a planned
starting date of 2019 and will become operational in 2024
(World Nuclear Association, 2018).
7In 2016, the Swedish government announced that it will
build up to 10 nuclear reactors in the coming years to re-
place its 8 existing reactors, which are ageing and due to
be decommissioned (Milne and Richard, 2016). As part
of its earlier policy to discriminate against nuclear power
production, in the late 1990s Sweden imposed a capacity
tax, which accounted for a quarter of the cost of nuclear
power, with the industry paying SEK 4.5 billion annually
by 2014 (World Nuclear Association, 2019a). Following
representations from the industry, the government agreed
to phase out the tax by 2019.
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no sensitivity to growth opportunities (−1.0317,
p > 0.10) in the Scandinavian civil law countries,
which is in contrast to lower sensitivity of RE in-
vestment (−1.1150, p < 0.01). This is arguably
because Nordic countries are strongly committed
to becoming virtually ‘fossil free’, with Denmark,
Sweden and Norway pursuing aggressive policies
to achieve 100% RE power generation, or car-
bon neutrality, by 2050 (Sovacool, 2017). Swe-
den plans to phase out nuclear reactors by 2045
(IAEA, 2018), although it will rely on this low-
carbon source of energy in the meantime to help
reduce its carbon footprint. These policies suggest
that power supply from traditional sources will di-
minish over time, making them progressively less
attractive to developers and investors, since a lack
of overt support for fossil fuels and nuclear energy
in the long term must raise doubts in their minds
about the prospects of growth in what are obsoles-
cent, ‘sunset industries’.
Traditional energy investment in German civil
law countries shows signiﬁcantly lower sensitivity
to Tobin’s Q (−3.2336, p < 0.01) compared to RE
investment in Table 5 (−0.9836, p < 0.10). Ar-
guably, this may be attributable to the heavy de-
pendence of Germany itself on large imports of
fossil fuels (Clean EnergyWire, 2018) and its strat-
egy of building conventional power stations (Acid
News, 2018). Despite this government policy of re-
placing existing conventional generators, since the
long-term aim is to substitute them with sustain-
able energy sources, it is clear that there is no future
for investment in TE such as coal-ﬁred power gen-
eration, which will be phased out by 2038 (Clean
Energy Wire, 2018), thus reducing its sensitivity to
Tobin’s Q signiﬁcantly.
Similar considerations apply to French civil law
countries, whose TE investment also shows lower
sensitivity to Tobin’s Q (−0.5566, p < 0.10). It
is well established that 75% of the electricity in
France is generated from nuclear power and the
country is a net exporter of electricity, earning €3
billion a year from this trade (World Nuclear As-
sociation, 2018). But its nuclear reactors are age-
ing and in need of imminent replacement (Min-
istre de l’Environnemont, de l’E´nergie et de laMer,
2016); and since it is unlikely that RE alternatives
will ﬁll the gap, more will have to be built. Albeit
these are government-sponsored civil engineering
projects, with stable investment ﬁnance underwrit-
ten by taxpayers, they do not offer investors the
promise of long-term growth, due to their being
gradually replaced by sustainable energy sources,
so ﬁrms’ investment sensitivity to Q reduces.
Overall, there are clear differences between RE
investment and TE investment in both common
and civil law countries, which are consistent with
the nature of investment. Therefore, these results
conﬁrm the rationale when RE power generation
is analysed as a separate entity.
National governance and renewable energy
investment
The third set of hypotheses of our study focus on
the extent to which country-level governance in-
ﬂuences RE investment under the two broad legal
systems of common law and civil law. The effec-
tiveness of a legal system depends on the capac-
ity of a country to enforce its law, the quality of
its regulation and the effectiveness of voice and ac-
countability (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). To test
these hypotheses, we examine the interactions of
three country-level governance variables, regula-
tory quality (Reg q), rule of law (Rule l), and voice
and accountability (V&A), with cash ﬂow and To-
bin’s Q, respectively, and compare the joint effects
between the two legal systems. Table 7 reports the
joint effects of country-level governance with cash
ﬂow on investment. Table 8 reports the joint effects
of country-level governance with Tobin’s Q on in-
vestment.
Investment cash ﬂow sensitivity. Table 7 shows
that country-level governance has no additional
impact on investment cash ﬂow sensitivity in a
common law system, supporting our argument
that the decision to invest is market-driven in such
a regime, and that investment responds to the
level of cash ﬂow that a company has at its dis-
posal, especially when access to external ﬁnance is
restricted. Albeit the framework of country-level
governance creates the environment in which neg-
ative consequences may follow illiquidity, the ex-
tension of capital for RE projects is determined
by well-established norms of market principles.
Government subsidies are inconsistently sustained
because of political and commercial expediency,
whereas lenders are primarily concerned with the
need to minimize credit risk, basing their judge-
ments on the ability of companies to generate
adequate returns to repay their debts. These re-
sults reinforce our contention that a system of
country-level governance does not modify the
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fundamental principles governing ﬁnancing pro-
visions in market-based economies, and RE ﬁrms
ﬁnd themselves constrained by the availability of
internal funds as a consequence.
In the case of civil law countries, the joint ef-
fects of regulatory quality (−0.1686, p < 0.01),
voice and accountability (−0.1098, p < 0.01) and
rule of law (−0.1228, p < 0.10) with cash ﬂow
demonstrate that a system of country-level gov-
ernance exerts a supplementary inﬂuence in re-
ducing RE ﬁrms’ investment sensitivity to in-
ternal cash ﬂow. These results are signiﬁcant as
they conﬁrm that the socio-political ethos in civil
law countries strongly favours ESG principles
and responsible investment in sustainable sources
of energy. For many years, Scandinavian gov-
ernments have sought to create capitalist social
democracies that promote the stakeholder per-
spective and pursue policies of universal social
welfare (Kenworthy, 2014), supporting the con-
tention that such principles permeate society at
every level. Conditioned by this beneﬁcent ethos,
governments provide the subsidies most critical
at the post-formative stage of development (Ab-
dmouleh, Alammari and Gasli, 2015; Shrimali,
Lynes and Indvik, 2015), thereby encouraging
the provision of bank and private investment.
Our evidence is consonant with Sovacool (2017),
that energy transitions are ‘signiﬁcantly driven’ by
government policies and systems of regional gover-
nance. ‘Subnational actors’ from cities, municipal-
ities, and even communes and local communities
undertake even more aggressive decarbonization
policies than those promulgated at a national level,
empowering Scandinavian countries to achieve the
highest levels of sustainable energy growth (So-
vacool, 2017). As we have also noted, Germany
pursues a similar form of ‘welfare capitalism’, in
which companies adopt a stakeholder perspective
(Dore, 2000), while civil law countries sustain what
Strand, Freeman and Hockerts (2015) describe as
cooperative business and institutional systems. In
these democratic civil law countries, the power-
ful inﬂuence of national-level governance moti-
vates companies to follow policies of openness and
transparency, reinforcing their CSR credentials
and giving them improved access to ﬁnance
(Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2013). The com-
bination of all these elements demonstrates con-
sistent support for our contention that a benign
social environment, operationalized in the fab-
ric of country-level governance, reduces ﬁnancial
constraints for RE projects in civil law countries,
which clearly distinguishes them from their coun-
terparts in common law countries.
Investment Q sensitivity. Table 8 shows that the
coefficients on the interaction term, GVi × Qi,t,
are positive but insigniﬁcant in the common law
system, indicating that country-level governance
has no additional effect on investment Q sensitiv-
ity. This may be due to there being insufficient ob-
servations from which to derive signiﬁcant results.
With respect to the civil law system, country-level
governance measures also have no additional im-
pact on investment Q sensitivity, which is consis-
tent with our contention that the ideals of social
welfare infuse all levels of society, creating a benef-
icent consensus. This underpins the policies of
governments and motivates the decision-making
of institutional and corporate actors, as well as in-
dividual citizens, making them of one accord in
their desire to promote the sustainability agenda.
Since business behaviours already fully reﬂect
these precepts, the overarching system of national
governance cannot bring a supplementary inﬂu-
ence to bear. Hence, its interaction with Q will be
insigniﬁcant.
Renewable energy investment excluding investment
in China
Developed countries have dominated the world’s
renewable energy development from the outset, but
recently emerging countries have begun to catch
up, introducing new dynamics to the overall pic-
ture. China, most notably, has invested substan-
tially in renewable energy since 2013, and total in-
vestment in RE exceeded that of the EU and the
USA, ranking it ﬁrst in the world in 2015 (Zhang
et al., 2016). To make a ﬁrm commitment to its
ambitions, the nation has granted a strategically
important position to renewable energy, and the
National 13th Five-Year Plan for the period 2016
to 2020 sets a target of a 15% share in total pri-
mary energy consumption by 2020 and 20% by
2030. In 2017, China also established a nation-
wide carbon trading platform, clearly signalling its
intent to control conventional energy output. In
the same year, its investment reached 45% of the
global deployment of RE, and the nation is pre-
dicted to dominate the sector in the coming decade
(Bloomberg, 2018), aided by a strongly centralized
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political system and a powerful governance com-
mand structure.
Despite considerable investment by China in re-
cent years, our baseline results in Table 5 do not
show a statistical signiﬁcance in investment sensi-
tivity to cash ﬂow or prospects of growth opportu-
nities. To ensure that our conclusions on H1 and
H2 are independent of a ‘China effect’, we think it
prudent to exclude this country from our estima-
tions when performing the analysis of the samples.
The results are reported in Table 9.
The results show that RE investment in com-
mon law countries is sensitive to cash ﬂow (0.1079,
p < 0.10); whereas RE investment in German law
countries is less sensitive to cash ﬂow (−0.1158,
p < 0.05), in comparison. With respect to To-
bin’s Q, RE investment shows positive sensitivity
for common law countries (0.8737, p < 0.10), but
much lower sensitivity for Scandinavia (−1.3440,
p < 0.01). These results display consistent direc-
tionality, in terms of their signs and signiﬁcance,
with those reported in Table 5, conﬁrming our
principal ﬁndings.
These results reinforce our argument that mar-
ket forces have greater sway in common law ju-
risdictions and that government intervention is
less likely, whereas the stakeholder perspective and
CSR principles prevail in civil law jurisdictions.
The lack of signiﬁcant inﬂuence from China is ar-
guably because its investments, albeit substantial
in recent years, have not been sustained over a
sufficiently long period to contribute enough time
series data. As we suggest, however, this is likely
to change in the not-too-distant future, at which
point the increase in available data will make it
possible to reassess China’s impact on the trajec-
tory of RE investment. As La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2008) observe, without suf-
ﬁcient long-term data it is difficult to generate ob-
jective evidence to determine the precise inﬂuence
of China’s inclusion in our models.
RE investment: GMM estimation
To ensure the robustness of our results and ad-
dress endogeneity, we further estimate the param-
eters in Eqs (1)–(4) by the GMM (Arellano and
Bond, 1991). All the variables are ﬁrst-differenced
to remove the individual ﬁrm effect. The param-
eters in the models are then estimated using or-
thogonal conditions, in which the lagged values
of endogenous variables are used as instruments.
The results of the dynamic models are reported in
Table 10. Model M1 reports the baseline results of
the dynamic investment model. Models M2 and
M3 report on the dynamics of RE investment of
the common law system, and Models M4 and M5
report on the dynamics of RE investment of the
subgroups of the civil law system.
Models M1–M5 show that the lagged invest-
ment, L.Ii,t, is positive and signiﬁcant across
all models, which indicates the existence of a
ﬁrst-order autoregressive component in ﬁrm
investment. The results of the majority of control
variables remain similar to those in the baseline
regressions reported in Table 5.
The main results for H1 and H2 continue to
hold. RE investment in common law countries
is sensitive to cash ﬂow (0.0686, p < 0.05). The
signs and directions of the coefficients on the
civil law subgroups with cash ﬂow interactions
are consistent with those in Table 5. The Scan-
dinavian group displays lower investment cash
ﬂow sensitivity (−0.4101, p < 0.05), arguably
because policies supporting subsidies, favourable
taxation regimes and other forms of ﬁnancial
backing are implemented extensively throughout
Scandinavia. Norway and Sweden, for instance,
have employed a Green Certiﬁcate scheme since
2010; while Denmark and Finland have used FiTs
since 2009 and 2010, respectively (IRENA, 2018).
The Swedish and Norwegian governments have
also recently extended the life of their Green Cer-
tiﬁcate scheme, subsidizing RE deployment (Cli-
mate Action, 2017). Moreover, the availability
of bank ﬁnance for RE in Nordic countries is
conducive to reducing companies’ ﬁnancial con-
straints. For example, the Nordic Investment Bank
offers loans repayable up to 25 years (Nordic In-
vestment Bank, 2019), which matches the current
duration of an RE development (Justice, 2009).
With respect to Tobin’s Q, RE investment shows
positive sensitivity for common law countries
(0.5724, p < 0.05). The results for the civil law
subgroups are consistent with those of the base-
line model, in terms of direction and signiﬁcance.
The GMM results corroborate H1 and H2, re-
inforcing our contention that differences between
RE investment decisions in common and civil
law countries are fundamentally conditioned by
countries’ legal origin, which determines investors’
and creditors’ rights, the strength of legal protec-
tions, and the nature of contract enforcement and
accountability.
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Conclusions
Our study investigates, for the ﬁrst time, the rela-
tionship between investment in renewable energy
development and the legal origin of the country in
which an RE ﬁrm operates. We examine 236 com-
panies worldwide to determine to what extent, and
in what ways, legal systems distinctively shape RE
investment, and how this process is inﬂuenced by
systems of national governance. Our ﬁndings offer
instructive insights into the countervailing forces
that both promote and retard the transition to sus-
tainable sources of energy.
Our investigation provides evidence of the
global imbalance in RE investment and an empiri-
cally based account of this phenomenon, conclud-
ing that the origin of a country’s legal system, and
the business principles to which it gives life, have
a signiﬁcant bearing on a nation’s contribution to
RE transition. First, we ﬁnd that RE companies
operating in market-based, common law systems
place a high emphasis on the perceived value of
projects when making RE investment. They face
higher constraints when raising external ﬁnance
because RE is perceived to be risky, with high
initial cost and positive returns not accruing for
20 to 25 years (Justice, 2009). Our evidence sup-
ports the argument that the primacy given to the
‘shareholder perspective’ in the laissez-faire mar-
ket economies prevalent in common law countries
accounts for the disinclination of companies to in-
vest in RE. This ethos also increases governments’
political circumspection in their decisions to grant
ﬁnancial incentives and makes ﬁnance providers
cautious when deciding whether to support de-
velopments. Our evidence suggests that RE in-
vestment in common law countries is as much a
socio-political as a commercial issue and that over-
coming ﬁnancial obstacles depends on societal, as
well as ﬁscal, change at a fundamental level of the
market-based system.
Second, we observe a signiﬁcant difference in
RE investment under civil law systems. Compa-
nies in such jurisdictions face lower ﬁnancing con-
straints in RE development, and display lower sen-
sitivity to their investments’ growth prospects, than
their counterparts in common law countries be-
cause of the prevailing ethos of the social and
business environments in which they trade. The
‘stakeholder perspective’ that prevails in civil law
countries engenders a cooperative business cul-
ture in which banks are willing to invest in com-
panies professing ESG credentials. Governments
pursue policies of centralized allocation and con-
trol, and are strongly committed to eliminating
carbon-based sources of energy and to being fossil-
fuel-free by 2050 (Sovacool, 2017), and this strat-
egy is an objectivemeasure of their ﬁscal and social
stance. The ‘welfare capitalism’ that such countries
practice facilitates RE development by motivating
ﬁnancial actors at regulatory and corporate levels
to strive for social well-being.
Third, our analysis demonstrates that the inﬂu-
ence of systems of country-level governance varies
in relation to legal origin. In civil law jurisdic-
tions, this governance facilitates RE investment
because ESG principles are predominant societal
goals, with both government and private lenders
advancing ﬁnance for projects that satisfy ‘green’
credentials, thereby reducing ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial con-
straints inREdevelopment. Arguably, the precepts
favouring social wealth creation, explicitly encour-
aged by the country-level governance system, are
consistently applied by regulatory and corporate
actors, uniting them in a benign alignment of prin-
ciples that gives impetus to the transition towards
carbon neutrality.Without such powerful endorse-
ments, companies engaged inRE developments, ir-
respective of their geo-political location, or of their
innate desire to contribute to social well-being, will
ﬁnd it difficult to raise ﬁnance for such high-risk in-
vestments. Conversely, in market-based, common
law countries, erratic government support for RE
projects (Victor and Yanosek, 2011) results in pe-
riodic retrenchment because of opposition from
consumers, who bear the cost of subsidization
(Barradale, 2010; Pearson andWatson, 2012; Shri-
mali, Lynes and Indvik, 2015). The ‘boom-and-
bust’ growth pattern that this creates discourages
the private sector from extending ﬁnancial back-
ing, as this would run counter to the fundamen-
tal business principles that condition funding deci-
sions. Theirs is a market-based decision alone, and
therefore the system of country-level governance
can bring no supplementary inﬂuence to bear on ﬁ-
nancial providers in their decisions to grant funds.
Overall, our study contributes new evidence of
the contention between the opportunity costs of
forgone economic gains and the pressing need to
counter the effects of global warming, demon-
strating how this conﬂict retards the transition
from fossil fuels to renewable sources of en-
ergy and suggesting how development can be
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stimulated by government backing, private invest-
ment, societal engagement and the alignment of
national strategies. Democratic civil law countries
have apparently achieved greater progress in over-
coming impediments to this transition than their
counterparts in common law systems, arguably be-
cause their adherence to CSR and ESG principles,
underpinned by political regimes strongly support-
ive of social welfare, inspires development. How,
therefore, can we use this knowledge to accelerate
the transition in those countries where RE deploy-
ment, albeit achieving signiﬁcant growth in recent
years, has been more problematical because of in-
consistent government backing and a lack of com-
mercial engagement? Does surviving the threat of
climate change require us to consider citizens’ ide-
alism as well as political obstacles, commercial ex-
pediency, ﬁnancial pragmatism and national id-
iosyncrasies that erect barriers to RE deployment?
Might it be that the successful transition to carbon
neutrality requires a social, as well as a ﬁscal, rev-
olution? If so, is it possible for government to ex-
ert a transformative inﬂuence on a culture implicit
in a legal system and, in so doing, engage public
support in removing obstacles to RE investment?
Research into these and related issues is vital if we
are to develop effective policies and actions at na-
tional and global levels to drive forward the tran-
sition from carbon-based to sustainable sources of
energy.
Some further thoughts
The urgent need to arrest the progress of climate
change is one of the most pressing, complex and
controversial issues confronting the world. The
lack of consistency in national approaches and
the absence of effective supranational coordination
threaten to undermine evolving strategies to fore-
stall the consequences of climate change. The ev-
idence presented to us of changes in weather pat-
terns due to global warming (IPCC, 2018), causing
reductions in the polar ice caps, shrinking glaciers,
and rising sea temperatures and sea levels, appear
to conﬁrm scientists’ worst predictions about the
perils that we face. Swift and concerted action is
thus imperative; and our research, building on the
research of others, has identiﬁed several ways to
overcome obstacles to progress.
First, we note that national rather than inter-
national approaches to RE development have ap-
peared to be the norm. Some progress has been
made, with 90 countries, states or provinces set-
ting targets for at least 50% renewable electricity in
2017 and 128 countries having regulatory policies
for the power sector (Goworek et al., 2018; Renew-
ables, 2018). Mandatory carbon reporting is now
enforced in the EU and in a total of 40 countries
across the world, with companies matching vary-
ing criteria required to report their greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions (CarbonFootprint, 2019). How-
ever, these positive steps have to be viewed against
a background of confounding evidence of incon-
sistent and unbalanced development. China, Eu-
rope and the USA accounted for 75% of RE in-
vestment in 2017. In the same period, subsidies for
RE amounted to US$140 billion while subsidies
for fossil fuels were US$360 billion (Renewables,
2018); while the UK planned to allocate a mere
£60m for the next round of renewable energy fund-
ing (Clark, 2019). Although the G20 reaffirmed its
commitment to phasing out ‘inefficient fossil fuel
subsidies’ (International Energy Agency/OECD,
2018), progress is slow and unstable. Granted that
the EU imposes targets on member states, there
seems to be a lack of uniformity in national policies
worldwide, with inconsistent progress between na-
tions. Moreover, while some countries seek to em-
brace RE policies, others continue to pollute the
world’s atmosphere on a massive scale. The global
warming conundrum calls for the creation of a sys-
tem of global governance to coordinate the world’s
response to the climate change crisis, extending
and enforcing mandatory regulations and supra-
national strategies and action plans to address
the concerns and recommendations of the Stern
Review (2006).8
Second, social acceptance is critical to success,
especially at this stage of consolidation in sustain-
able energy development. The cost of investment
in RE is high and positive returns may not be
achieved for many years, so market solutions are
unlikely to be effective in the short to medium
term without government backing. However, the
social burden imposed by subsidies falls primar-
ily on consumers, resulting in a political backlash
8The Stern Review (2006) asserts that an expenditure of
around 1% of world GDP per year is needed to effect
environmental improvements, whose beneﬁcial outcomes
will more than compensate for their cost. The report also
notes that developing as well as advanced nations must
adopt such policies if global warming is to be averted, al-
beit that they have limited economic resources.
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that compels governments to reduce, or even with-
draw, ﬁnancial support for RE. Social acceptance
is therefore a prerequisite for sustained develop-
ment, requiring the approval of both commerce
and communities, and national and local govern-
ments must do more to persuade their electorates
of the dangers of climate change and the beneﬁts to
be gained from RE investment. The failure to con-
vince many ordinary citizens of the perils of global
warmingmust be confronted, sincemillions of vot-
ers make their feelings known at the ballot box and
are likely to elect leaders who share their views.9
Arguably, grassroots protests against the costs
to consumers of developing renewable sources of
energy, such as the recent gilet-jaune protests in
France, demand to be countered by grassroots sup-
port for investment, engaging public sympathy,
such as that expressed by the Extinction Rebellion
demonstrations in the UK and elsewhere.10 There
is a growing awareness of the gravity of the crisis
that we face, especially among the younger gen-
eration, who have the most to lose from global
warming.11 The power of public idealism that
manifests itself in suchmovements must not be un-
derestimated, and a proselytizing approach could
well convince the sceptics where rational argu-
ment has so far not gained universal acceptance.
In addition, shareholder activists and institutional
investors should coordinate their campaigns to
bring even greater pressure to bear on manage-
ments, demanding that companies adopt climate-
friendly policies and exposing their transgressions
at AGMs to public criticism, thereby threatening
share prices (Sustainability, 2018). Undoubtedly,
government intervention to overcome public resis-
tance, supported by global, public education and
engagement programmes, is essential if RE devel-
opment is not to stall, as echoed by Shrimali, Lynes
and Indvik (2015). Policy-makers, however, need
9The unilateral withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Ac-
cord on climate change, in the aftermath of the presiden-
tial election of 2016, is an indication of the countervailing
political pressures that RE development confronts.
10‘Extinction Rebellion is an international movement that
uses non-violent civil disobedience in an attempt to halt
mass extinction and minimize the risk of social collapse’:
https://rebellion.earth.
11Children across the world have recently gone on strike
from schools to join mass marches and demonstrations
against global warming. They claim that the older gener-
ation are indifferent to the plight of the young, question-
ing the point of attending school when their future will be
destroyed by climate change. (BBC News, 2018, 2019).
to exercise caution as they tread a narrow path be-
tween the pragmatic and the ideal if social accep-
tance is to be secured.
Third, business leaders need to create sustain-
able business models to support RE development.
As advances in technology are starting to drive
down the costs of installing RE infrastructure, in-
vestments in what is seen as a high-risk industry
are beginning to show signs of positive returns
(Bloomberg, 2018). This growing market, with in-
ward investment in China standing currently at
US$2.3 trillion (Bloomberg, 2018), has much to
attract entrepreneurial interest, and ﬁrst-movers
may eventually be able to exploit improvements
in technology and economies of scale. Surges in
investment, albeit stalling periodically (Shrimali,
Lynes and Indvik, 2015), will surely engage the
attention of international business leaders and ﬁ-
nance providers as the RE industry matures and
installation costs continue to fall. At this stage
of development, global players should adopt an
international portfolio investment strategy, while
integrating new skills and rapidly emerging tech-
nologies and innovations, laying down the foun-
dations of a sustainable energy sector and pro-
moting the commercialization of renewable energy
markets. In the meantime, managements must de-
velop control systems, governance structures and
procedures within their organizations to mitigate
and ultimately eliminate climate risk. Without
such approaches and the establishment of feasible
cross-country investment portfolios and business
strategies, progress will continue in its present, dis-
organized pattern.
Fourth, it is clear from our research that ﬁ-
nancial resources are fundamental to the sustain-
able development of RE technology. Conventional
markets alone will not provide a solution, es-
pecially in common law countries; but even in
civil law jurisdictions, where strong CSR princi-
ples tend to support RE deployment, the costs
imposed by subsidization have not been univer-
sally accepted. Increases in power bills, caused
by rising wholesale and environmental costs, have
provoked public anger and frustration across Eu-
rope (Bate, Barteczko and Twidale, 2019). The
controversial nature of government subsidies, paid
for by increases in power bills, suggests that this
cannot be a long-term strategy for RE devel-
opment, and that commercial and socially ac-
ceptable ﬁnancial support mechanisms need to
be devised. Many countries are starting to issue
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green bonds (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2018), but
fund managers have called for more aggressive ex-
tensions of such schemes, suggesting that ‘green
gilts’, with government-guaranteed capital and in-
come, would attract signiﬁcant levels of investment
(Walker, Zhang and Ni, 2019). Governments must
do more to urge conventional banks to offer RE
companies with strong ESG credentials easier ac-
cess to investment ﬁnance. Financial markets and
institutions should play a pivotal role in devel-
oping innovative carbon-neutral ﬁnancial instru-
ments and green derivatives to satisfy the demands
of RE investment. Unconventional methods of
raising capital, such as marketplace lending and
large-scale private equity, could also play a part.
Crowd-funding, in particular, has raised substan-
tial sums from an uncritical public for socially in-
spired causes, suggesting that this and the develop-
ment of other ethical sources of ﬁnance might help
to inspire the idealism of a disenchanted public.
Ideologically based forms of ﬁnancing could suc-
ceedwhere conventionalmethods have so farmade
limited progress, and innovative approaches are,
therefore, crucial to transmit a strong and timely
impetus to the development of this ﬂedgling indus-
try.
There are no easy solutions to this global conun-
drum, and a quotation from a philosopher whose
country appears destined to play a signiﬁcant role
in RE development seems apposite: ‘The journey
of a thousand miles begins with one step’ (Lao
Tzu). We have already set foot on a long and ar-
duous road, and our hope must be that it will lead
to a destination where environmental pollution is
eliminated and its existential threat removed.
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